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Abstract
The activity recognition is a very big challenge for the entire research community. Thus,
there are already numerous techniques able to find occurrences of activities in time-
stamped observation data (e.g., a video, a sequence of transactions at a website, etc.)
with each occurrence having an associated probability.
However, all these techniques rely on models encoding a priori knowledge of either
normal or malicious behavior. They cannot deal with events such as “zero day” attacks
that have never been seen before. In practice, all these methods are incapable of quanti-
fying how well available models explain a sequence of events observed in an observation
stream.
By the way, the goal of this thesis is different: in order to address the issue listed
above, we want to find the subsequences of the observation data, called unexplained
sequences, that known models are not able to “explain” with a certain confidence.
Thus, we start with a known set A of activities (both innocuous and dangerous) that
we wish to monitor and we wish to identify “unexplained” subsequences in an observa-
tion sequence that are poorly explained (e.g., because they may contain occurrences of
activities that have never been seen or anticipated before, i.e. they are not in A).
We formally define the probability that a sequence of observations is unexplained
(totally or partially) w.r.t. A. We develop efficient algorithms to identify the top-k To-
tally and Partially Unexplained Activities w.r.t. A. These algorithms leverage theorems
that enable us to speed up the search for totally/partially unexplained activities. We de-
scribe experiments using real-world video and cyber security datasets showing that our
approach works well in practice in terms of both running time and accuracy.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 The “Unexplained” Activity Problem
Identifying unexpected activities is an important problem in a wide variety of applica-
tions such as video surveillance, cyber security, fault detection in safety critical systems,
and fraud detection.
For instance, airport baggage areas are continuously monitored for suspicious activ-
ities by video surveillance. In crime-ridden neighborhoods, police often monitor streets
and parking lots using video surveillance. In Israel, highways are monitored for suspi-
cious activities by a central authority. However, all these applications search for known
activities—activities that have been identified in advance as being either innocuous or
dangerous. For instance, in the highway application, security officers may look both for
normal behavior (e.g. driving along the highway in a certain speed range unless traffic
is slow) as well as “suspicious” behavior (e.g. stopping the car near a bridge, taking a
package out and leaving it on the side of the road before driving away).
In cyber security, intrusion detection can monitor network traffic for suspicious be-
havior and trigger security alerts. Alert correlation methods aggregate alerts into multi-
step attack scenarios. However, both techniques rely on models encoding a priori knowl-
edge of either normal or malicious behavior. They cannot deal with events such as “zero
day” attacks that have never been seen before. In practice, all these methods are inca-
pable of quantifying how well available models explain a sequence of events observed in
an observation stream.
2 1 Introduction
1.2 Thesis goal
In order to address the issues described in section 1.1 , we designed and implemented a
framework (the Unexplained Sequence Detector), able to discover the subsequences of
the observation stream not sufficiently explained by well-known activity models.
Figure 1.1 shows how our framework would work in practice. We start with a set of
activity modelsA for both “good” and “bad” activities. Good activities are activities that
are considered appropriate (e.g., certain permitted behaviors in an airport secure baggage
zone) while bad activities are ones known to be inappropriate (e.g., a baggage handler
opening a suitcase, taking items out, and putting them in a different bag). Techniques
already exist to find occurrences of activities in time-stamped observation data (e.g.,
a video, a sequence of transactions at a website, etc.) with each occurrence having an
associated probability. In this thesis, our goal is to find an unexplained sequence detector,
i.e. to identify subsequences of the observation data, called unexplained sequences, that
known models are not able to “explain” with a certain confidence. In other words, what is
happening in unexplained sequences is not well captured by the available activity models
in A. Once such subsequences have been identified, they can be further analyzed, e.g.,
Figure 1.1: Overall working of unexplained sequences
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to learn new activity models from them. Or, as shown in Figure 1.1, each unexplained
sequence can be shown to a domain expert (e.g., airport security or cyber security expert)
who can then add these observed sequences or generalizations thereof to the currently
known list of good or bad activities.
Unexplained sequences allow an application to identify activities never seen or imag-
ined before by experts, and to add them to an increasing body of such knowledge. For
instance, a new type of terrorist attack at an airport or a zero-day attack on a computer
system, may involve sequences of actions (observations) not seen before—and hence not
captured by past activity models (i.e., those in A). In this thesis, we primarily focus on
the unexplained sequence detector component of Figure 1.1.
We achieve this via a possible-worlds based model and define the probability that a
sequence of observations is totally (or partially) unexplained. Users can then look for
all observation sequences that are totally (or partially) unexplained with a probability
exceeding a threshold that they specify. We show important properties of our mathemat-
ical model that can be leveraged to speed up the search for unexplained activities. We
define algorithms to find top-k totally and partially unexplained activities. We develop
a prototype implementation and report on experiments using two video data sets and a
cyber security dataset showing that the algorithms work well in practice, both from an
efficiency perspective and an accuracy perspective.
1.3 Thesis outline
The paper starts (Chapter 2) with an overview of related work. Chapter 3 provides basic
definitions of stochastic activities slightly extending [1] (section 3.1), defines the prob-
ability that a sequence is totally (or partially) unexplained, the problem of finding the
top-k (totally or partially) unexplained activities and classes (section 3.2) and finally
derives theorems that enable fast search for totally and partially unexplained activities
(subsection 3.2.1). Chapter 4 presents algorithms for solving the problems introduced in
Chapter 3. Chapter 5 describes our prototype implementations developed in the video
surveillance and cyber security domains and the related experiments. Chapter 6 presents
the conclusions of the thesis and the possible future works.

Chapter 2
Related Work
We are not aware of domain-independent prior work on discovering unexplained activi-
ties. However, specific work in the domains of video and cyber-security have focused on
anomalous activity detection.
2.1 Video Analysis
2.1.1 A Priori Definitions.
Several researchers have studied how to search for specifically defined patterns of nor-
mal/abnormal activities [2].
The most relevant approaches following this philosophy are:
• DBN (Dynamic Bayesian Networks)
• HMM (Hidden Markov Models)
2.1.1.1 DBN (Dynamic Bayesian Networks)
Bayesian Networks have been used in many researches; for instance, Buxton used Bayesian
Belief Networks for the video interpretation in an application of traffic surveillance [3].
Huang [4] used them for the video interpretation of an airport scenery, Nevatia [5] to
single out the interactions in a group of people. Intille e Bobick [6] used Bayesian Net-
works to single out numerous activities during a football match. Notwithstanding this,
no information is supplied on how the learning of the net parameters occurs.
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Besides the learning problem, the BN have a further defect. They are not suited
to model temporal relationships. As a matter of fact, the time during which the net
building takes place is to be explicitly pointed out. Particular dynamic Bayesian Nets, the
recurrent Bayesian Networks, have been used for the singling out of human behaviours
through the temporal evolution of facial features. Though the RBN have the advantage
of being independent of the event temporal scale, the learning is still complex and the
difference of representation between the spatial relationships and the temporal ones is
not clear.
They are direct acyclic graphs (DAGs) which, based on Bayesian rules, express rela-
tions of conditional dependence (through direct arcs) among random variables (nodes).
Given two events, A and B, if these are correlated in some way, we can think that know-
ing one of them which has just happened can improve the knowledge of the other event
probability.
Now, we can formalize these networks. Given a probability space (Ω,A,P[]), where:
• Ω is the sample space (the collection of the all possible results of the experiment)
• A is the Event space (which contains Ω)
• P[] is a probability function with domain in A and codomain in [0,1]
Given two Events, A and B, which belong to A, the following expression
P[A|B]
represents that A happens knowing that B has just happened; that is the probability
of A conditioned by B.
Then, we can define the Bayesian rule: for two events, A and B, belonging to set A,
the following relation is valid:
P [A|B] = P [A,B]
P [B]
, (ifP [B] 6= 0) (2.1)
where:
P [A|B] = P [B|A] ∗ P [A] (2.2)
Generalizing to a generic number of elements, we can derive the same conclusions:
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Given a probability space (Ω,A,P[]), there are:
• B1, B2, ...., Bn belonging to A
• ∀i, P [Bi] > 0; i 6= j, BiBj = 0; Ω =
⋃
iBi
For each event A belonging to the set A, we have the following relation:
P [Bk|A] = P [A|Bk]P [Bk]
(
∑
i
P [A|Bi]P [Bi])
(2.3)
A Bayesian Network is a graph for which the following properties are valid:
• A set of random variables represent network nodes;
• A set of edges, having a direction, connect the couples of nodes (the intuitive
meaning of an arrow from X node to Y node is that X has a direct influence on Y);
• Each node has a conditional probability table which quantifies the effects that ”par-
ents” have on the node, where for parents we want to denote all the nodes whose
arrows are going to the considered node;
• The graph has not direct cycles;
• A node that has not direct parents has a table of marginal probabilities; if the node
is discrete, it contains a probability distribution on the states of the variable that it
represents; if the node is continuous, it contains a density gaussian function of the
random variable which it represents;
• If a node has no parents, then the node contains a conditional probability table.
The graphic structure of a BN allows a non ambiguous representation of inter-dependence
among variables, which causes the most important feature of such type of networks: in
fact, combined probability distribution X = {X1, X2, ...., Xn} can be factorized in terms
of the product among the network CPTs.
P (X = x) =
n∏
i=1
P (Xi|pii) (2.4)
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2.1.1.2 HMM (Hidden Markov Models)
A HMM is a probabilistic model in which the system to be modelled is taken as a process
of Markov’s with unknown parameters that can be obtained from observable parameters,
while in a regular Markov model the state can be directly seen by the observer and the
only parameters are the probabilities of the transitions among the states, in a hidden
Markov model the state cannot be directly seen but only the variables affected by the
states themselves can be accessed.
Each state has a distribution of probability pertinent to the possible output token. On
the other hand the sequence of the tokens generated by a HMM gives some information
about the sequence of the states. The principle of this approach is the use of Markovian
hypothesis. The probability of being in a given state depends only on the probability of
being in the previous one. HMM have been chosen to recognize the American [7] sign
language [8] within the limits of oral identification or for identification in writing [9].
Using the HMM, Hongeng [10] [5] has presented an approach to recognize mono-state
and multi-state activities in a dynamic scenery. Zhang [11] et al. use them to point out
Anomalous Events. The HMM advantage compared with Bayesian nets is the ability to
recognize a sequence of events, but are not as convenient for activities that involve more
that one person. Coupled Hidden Markov Models have been presented by Brand [12]
et al. to reduce this problem, but, once again, they turn out to be inadequate when the
activity subjects are more than two, a situation that requires too complex a model and
a relevant number of parameters, besides a great learning difficulty during the learning
session.
Figure 2.1: Hidden Markov Model
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HMM are characterized by the presence of nodes and arcs, as we can see in the 2.2
figure.
Figure 2.2: Relations among States in Hidden Markov Model
Each node represents a random variable which can accept a certain number of values.
The random variable x(t) is the value of the hidden variable at ”t” temporal instant.
The random variable y(t) represents the value of the variable observed at ”t” temporal
instant. Arrows in the diagram indicate conditional dependencies. It is easy to deduce,
observing the diagram, that the value of the hidden variable x(t) is only dependent on
the value of the hidden variable x(t-1) (at ”t-1” temporal instant). This theory is called
Markov’s theory. Similarly, the value of the observed variable y(t) only depends on the
value of the hidden variable x(t).
The probability of an observed sequence Y = y(0),y(1),....,y(L-1) of length L is:
P (Y ) =
∑
X
P (Y |X)P (X) (2.5)
where the sum involves all the possible hidden node sequences X = x(0),x(1),....,x(L-
1)
There are three fundamental problems about HMM:
• Given the model parameters, calculate the probability of a particular output se-
quence. This problem can be solved through a forward-backward procedure.
• Given the model parameters, find the sequence of hidden nodes which can have
probably generated a certain output sequence. This problem can be solved by
Viterbi’s algorithm.
• Given an output sequence or a collection of sequences, find the set of transitions
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among states and output probabilities that have probably caused such outputs. In
other words, induce a HMM to establish its parameters for a given sequence of
observations. This problem can be resolved by Baum-Welch’s algorithm.
2.1.1.3 Relevant Works
There are numerous relevant works in literature following DBN and HMM approaches.
For instance, [13] studies how HMMs can be used to recognize complex activites, while
[14] and [15] use coupled HMMs. [16] uses Dynamic Bayesian Networks (DBNs) to
capture causal relationships between observations and hidden states. [1] developed a
stochastic automaton based language to detect activities in video, while [17] presented
a HMM-based algorithm. In contrast, this thesis starts with a set A of activity models
(corresponding to innocuous/dangerous activities) and finds observation sequences that
are not sufficiently explained by the models in A. Such unexplained sequences reflect
activity occurrences that differ from the application’s expectations.
2.1.2 Learning and then detecting abnormality
2.1.2.1 Pattern Recognition and Machine Learning
The problem of searching for patterns in data is a fundamental one and has a long and
successful history. For instance, the extensive astronomical observations of Tycho Brahe
in the 16th century allowed Johannes Kepler to discover the empirical laws of planetary
motion, which in turn provided a springboard for the development of classical mechan-
ics. Similarly, the discovery of regularities in atomic spectra played a key role in the
development and verification of quantum physics in the early twentieth century. The
field of pattern recognition is concerned with the automatic discovery of regularities in
data through the use of computer algorithms and with the use of these regularities to take
actions such as classifying the data into different categories. Consider the example of
recognizing handwritten digits. Each digit corresponds to a 28 ∗ 28 pixel image and so
can be represented by a vector x comprising 784 real numbers. The goal is to build a
machine that will take such a vector x as input and that will produce the identity of the
digit 0, . . . , 9 as the output. This is a nontrivial problem due to the wide variability of
handwriting. It could be tackled using handcrafted rules or heuristics for distinguishing
the digits based on the shapes of the strokes, but in practice such an approach leads to a
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proliferation of rules and of exceptions to the rules and so on, and invariably gives poor
results.
Far better results can be obtained by adopting a machine learning approach in which
a large set of N digits x1, ..., xN called a training set is used to tune the parameters of
an adaptive model. The categories of the digits in the training set are known in advance,
typically by inspecting them individually and hand-labelling them. We can express the
category of a digit using target vector t, which represents the identity of the correspond-
ing digit.
The result of running the machine learning algorithm can be expressed as a function
y(x) which takes a new digit image x as input and that generates an output vector y,
encoded in the same way as the target vectors. The precise form of the function y(x) is
determined during the training phase, also known as the learning phase, on the basis of
the training data. Once the model is trained it can then determine the identity of new
digit images, which are said to comprise a test set. The ability to categorize correctly
new examples that differ from those used for training is known as generalization. In
practical applications, the variability of the input vectors will be such that the training
data can comprise only a tiny fraction of all possible input vectors, and so generalization
is a central goal in pattern recognition. For most practical applications, the original input
variables are typically pre-processed to transform them into some new space of variables
where, it is hoped, the pattern recognition problem will be easier to solve. For instance,
in the digit recognition problem, the images of the digits are typically translated and
scaled so that each digit is contained within a box of a fixed size. This greatly reduces
the variability within each digit class, because the location and scale of all the digits are
now the same, which makes it much easier for a subsequent pattern recognition algorithm
to distinguish between the different classes. This pre-processing stage is sometimes also
called feature extraction. Note that new test data must be pre-processed using the same
steps as the training data.
Pre-processing might also be performed in order to speed up computation. For exam-
ple, if the goal is real-time face detection in a high-resolution video stream, the computer
must handle huge numbers of pixels per second, and presenting these directly to a com-
plex pattern recognition algorithm may be computationally infeasible. Instead, the aim is
to find useful features that are fast to compute, and yet that also preserve useful discrim-
inatory information enabling faces to be distinguished from non-faces. These features
12 2 Related Work
are then used as the inputs to the pattern recognition algorithm. For instance, the aver-
age value of the image intensity over a rectangular subregion can be evaluated extremely
efficiently, and a set of such features can prove very effective in fast face detection. Be-
cause the number of such features is smaller than the number of pixels, this kind of
pre-processing represents a form of dimensionality reduction. Care must be taken during
pre-processing because often information is discarded, and if this information is impor-
tant to the solution of the problem then the overall accuracy of the system can suffer.
Applications in which the training data comprises examples of the input vectors
along with their corresponding target vectors are known as supervised learning prob-
lems. Cases such as the digit recognition example, in which the aim is to assign each
input vector to one of a finite number of discrete categories, are called classification
problems. If the desired output consists of one or more continuous variables, then the
task is called regression. An example of a regression problem would be the prediction of
the yield in a chemical manufacturing process in which the inputs consist of the concen-
trations of reactants, the temperature, and the pressure.
In other pattern recognition problems, the training data consists of a set of input vec-
tors x without any corresponding target values. The goal in such unsupervised learning
problems may be to discover groups of similar examples within the data, where it is
called clustering, or to determine the distribution of data within the input space, known
as density estimation, or to project the data from a high-dimensional space down to two
or three dimensions for the purpose of visualization.
Finally, the technique of reinforcement learning is concerned with the problem of
finding suitable actions to take in a given situation in order to maximize a reward. Here
the learning algorithm is not given examples of optimal outputs, in contrast to supervised
learning, but must instead discover them by a process of trial and error. Typically there
is a sequence of states and actions in which the learning algorithm is interacting with its
environment. In many cases, the current action not only affects the immediate reward
but also has an impact on the reward at all subsequent time steps. For example, by using
appropriate reinforcement learning techniques a neural network can learn to play the
game of backgammon to a high standard. Here the network must learn to take a board
position as input, along with the result of a dice throw, and produce a strong move as the
output. This is done by having the network play against a copy of itself for perhaps a
million games. A major challenge is that a game of backgammon can involve dozens of
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moves, and yet it is only at the end of the game that the reward, in the form of victory,
is achieved. The reward must then be attributed appropriately to all of the moves that led
to it, even though some moves will have been good ones and others less so. This is an
example of a credit assignment problem. A general feature of reinforcement learning is
the trade-off between exploration, in which the system tries out new kinds of actions to
see how effective they are, and exploitation, in which the system makes use of actions that
are known to yield a high reward. Too strong a focus on either exploration or exploitation
will yield poor results. Reinforcement learning continues to be an active area of machine
learning research. Although each of these tasks needs its own tools and techniques, many
of the key ideas that underpin them are common to all such problems.
2.1.2.2 Relevant Works
Several researchers in the literature followed this approach in order to find abnormal
activities: so, they usually first learn normal activity models and then detect abnor-
mal/unusual events. [18] suggests a semi-supervised approach to detect abnormal events
that are rare, unexpected, and relevant. We do not require “unexplained” events to ei-
ther be rare or relevant. [19] uses HMMs to detect rare events, while [20] defines an
anomaly as an atypical behavior pattern that is not represented by sufficient samples in a
training dataset and satisfies an abnormal pattern. [21] defines abnormality as unseen or
rarely occurring events—an initial video is used to learn normal behaviors. [22] shows
how to detect users with abnormal activities from sensors attached to human bodies. An
abnormal activity is defined as “an event that occurs rarely and has not been expected
in advance”. The same notion of abnormal activity is considered in [23] and [24]. [25]
learns patterns of activities over time in an unsupervised way. [26] detects individual
anomalies in crowd scenes—an anomaly is defined as a rare or infrequent behavior com-
pared to all other behaviors. Common activities are accepted as normal and infrequent
activity patterns are flagged as abnormal. All these approaches first learn normal activity
models and then detect abnormal/unusual events. These approaches differ from ours as
they consider rare events to be abnormal. In contrast, we consider activities to be unex-
plained even if they are not rare and the available models are not able to capture them.
For example, if a new way to break into cars has occurred many times (and we do not
have a model for it), then we want to flag sequences where those activities occur as “un-
explained” even if they are not rare. In addition, if a model exists for a rare activity, we
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would flag it as “explained”, while many of these frameworks would not.
2.1.3 Similarity-based abnormality.
2.1.3.1 Main features
Another category of approaches able to find unusual activities deals with similarity-based
abnormality.
In general, for similarity-based approaches, the main task is to define pairwise dis-
tances between all the data points and identify outliers by examining the distance to an
examples nearest neighbors. An example is the work by Breunig et al. [27], who applied
a density-based clustering algorithm to efficiently detect local outliers. Based on the
distance measure and user-defined density thresholds, these algorithms can efficiently
detect the occurrence of outliers (or abnormal points) in a high-dimensional space. The
basic principle is that if the neighboring points are relatively close, the example is con-
sidered normal; otherwise, the example is considered abnormal. The advantage of these
approaches is that no explicit distribution needs to be defined to determine outliers and
that the methods can be made efficiently for large data sets. However, a difficulty in
these approaches lies in the question of how to define effective similarity measures when
a large amount of uncertainty exists. For example, in the sensor network area, sensor
readings received from sensors vary greatly from time to time, following a stochastic
nature. Thus, it would be very difficult to define a distance measure that is sufficiently
robust in these settings, making it difficult also to define density measures. Another dif-
ficulty lies in the requirement in our problem that the algorithm must be online; that is,
efficient models need to be trained ahead of time in order to efficiently detect abnormal
events as they occur. Therefore, in summary, when the data do not provide clear-cut
shapes, and when the data are stochastic in nature, as in the case of sensor readings, the
similarity- based and distance-based approaches cannot work well.
2.1.3.2 Relevant works
[28] proposes an unsupervised technique in which no explicit models of normal activities
are built. Each event in the video is compared with all other observed events to determine
how many similar events exist. Unusual events are events for which there are no similar
events in the video. Hence, this thesis also considers unusual activity as a rare event
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and a large number of observations is required to verify if an activity is unusual. [29]
uses a similar approach: a scene is considered anomalous when the maximum similarity
between the scene and all previously viewed scenes is below a threshold. In [30], fre-
quently occurring patterns are normal and patterns that are dissimilar from most patterns
are anomalous. [31] learns trajectory prototypes and detects anomalous behaviors when
visual trajectories deviate from the learned representations of typical behaviors. An un-
supervised approach, where an abnormal trajectory refers to something that has never
(or rarely) seen, has been proposed in [32]. A normal trajectory is intended to be one
similar enough to one or more trajectories that the system already knows. In [13], activ-
ities performed by a group of moving and interacting objects are modeled as shapes and
abnormal activities are defined as a change in the shape activity model. In the context of
elder care, [33] proposes an approach that first analyzes and designs features, and then
detects abnormal activities using a method based on the designed features and Support
Vector Data Description. [34] proposes a methodology to characterize novel scenes over
long time periods without a priori knowledge. A hierarchical modeling process, charac-
terizing an activity at multiple levels of resolution, is developed to classify and predict
future activities and detect abnormal behavior.
2.1.4 Other relevant work
In [35], unusual events are detected by monitoring the scene with monitors which extract
local low-level observations from the video stream. The monitor computes the likelihood
of a new observation with respect to the probability distribution of prior observations. If
the likelihood falls below a threshold, then the monitor outputs an alert. The local alerts
issued by the monitors are then combined. [36] automatically learns high frequency
events (taking spatio-temporal aspects into account) and declares them normal—events
deviating from these rules are anomalies. [37] learns storylines from weakly labeled
videos. A storyline includes the actions that occur in a video and their causal relation-
ships. AND-OR graphs are used to represent storyline models.
The first preliminary notion of unexplained activities used in this thesis has been
introduced in [38].
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2.2 Cyber Security
Intrusion detection and alert correlation techniques provide valuable and complementary
tools for identifying and monitoring security threats in complex network infrastructures.
Intrusion detection systems (IDS) can monitor network traffic for suspicious behavior
and trigger security alerts accordingly [39], [40], [41]. Alert correlation methods can
aggregate such alerts into multi-step attack scenarios [42], [43], [44], [39], [45]. Intru-
sion detection has been studied for about thirty years, since it was first identified in the
Anderson report [46], and it is based on the assumption that an intruder’s behavior will
be noticeably different from that of a legitimate user and that many unauthorized actions
are detectable [39].
2.2.1 Intrusion detection
The historical evolution of computer systems along with the Internet has drastically re-
duced the cost of transporting information over the world thanks to more work being
done online. With the apparent effectiveness of internet working, today’s networked
information systems are expanding ubiquitously. Indeed, recent years have seen the
explosive growth in the number of devices interconnected to computer and telecommu-
nication networks. As a result, tremendous amounts of data are transmitted from and
to, processed, and stored at central networked information systems. Without doubts, the
networked information systems play crucial roles for most governments, enterprises, and
even individuals. Therefore, they must remain not only up-and running but also secure
against unwanted harmful actions such as attack, misuse, and abuse. However, the infor-
mation systems have witnessed ever-increasing instances of malicious activities despite
the existence of a variety of security technologies. Attackers attempt to steal, modify,
and destroy valuable information and at worst damage the victim systems. And also,
attackers often attempt to make services merely unavailable to intended legitimate users
by exhausting the system resources DoS/DDoS. In many systems, security cannot al-
low these threats because the impact of such attacks is immeasurable and irrevocable.
Despite of the existence of a variety of security measures, attackers eventually manage
to get through them and this helps attacking techniques to speedily evolve. Thus, even
if a security system fails to defend against an attack, it should be well aware of being
attacked and have a mechanism to perform countermeasures in order to prevent further
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attacks and reduce the damage and loss resulting from the attack. That is the main aim
of Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS).
Thus, intrusion detection is the process of monitoring the events occurring in a com-
puter system or network and analyzing them for signs of possible incidents, which are
violations or imminent threats of violation of computer security policies, acceptable use
policies, or standard security practices. Intrusion prevention is the process of performing
intrusion detection and attempting to stop detected incidents happening again. Intrusion
detection and prevention systems (IDPS) are primarily focused on identifying possible
incidents, logging information about them, attempting to stop them, and reporting them
to security administrators. In addition, organizations use IDPSs for other purposes, such
as documenting existing threats, identifying problems with security policies, and de-
terring individuals from violating them. IDPSs have become a necessary addition to the
security infrastructure of nearly every organization that relies on information technology.
Intrusion detection has been an active field of research for about three decades, start-
ing in 1980 with the publication of John Andersons report, Computer Security Threat
Monitoring and Surveillance. In an informatic system, says Anderson, an intrusion is
any attempt to breach security, dependability and availability of this system.
Intrusion detection is based on the assumption that an intruder’s behavior will be no-
ticeably different from that of a legitimate user and that many unauthorized actions are
detectable. Infact, Anderson states [46]: ”Intrusion detection systems analize informa-
tion about the activity performed in a computer system or network, looking for evidence
of malicous behavior”, that is to say an IDS is a system that detects unauthorized ac-
cess or potential attacks on informatic systems through informations source available
on the system (log) or on the network (network traffic). In addition, IDSs are systems
used mainly for monitoring network traffic through a set of rules and flexible algorithms
in order to detect attacks on the autonomous system (AS) involved. In figure 2.3 the
architecture of a generic IDS is reported , and its principal component are shown:
• Data collection: in this phase the traffic envolved on interested system is collected
and stored.
• Detection: in this step the data are analyzed and a subset of them are detected
according to state information and detection policy.
• Response: in this step the output of IDS is built according to response policy.
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Figure 2.3: IDS architecture
Compared with the modality of analysis selected, it is possible to distinguish two
types of intrusion detection systems [47]:
Signature based: An IDS is called signature based [40] if it uses a knowledge base in
order to detect an attack. An IDS analyzes the collected data and compares them to a set
of attack signatures to discover any anomaly actions. So, an anomaly action is discovered
if it exists by a correspondence between its signature and that of a known attack, stored
in a knowledge base. A signature is a pattern that corresponds to a known threat while
signature-based detection is the process of comparing signatures against observed events
to identify possible incidents. Examples of signatures are the following:
• A telnet attempt with a username of root is a violation of an organization’s security
policy.
• An e-mail with a subject of Free pictures and an attachment filename of freep-
ics.exe, which are characteristics of a known form of malware.
• An operating system log entry with a status code value of 645, which indicates that
the hosts auditing has been disabled.
Usually, an attack signature belongs to only one attack and it is possible that an attack
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signature can be associated with more than one attack. On the one hand the simplicity
of the approach and the possibility to use established techniques and optimized pattern
matching make the use of IDS (misuses based) preferable; on the other hand, its quality
depends only on set of the signature compared.
Anomaly based: An anomaly based IDS [40] tries to build correct models of resources’
normal activity and stores them in a knowledge base. This IDS detects anomaly activi-
ties through a comparison of the stored actions with another knowledge base of known
threats; quantitatively, an action is considered important if some features of actions ex-
ceed the appropriate thresholds. Thus, Anomaly-based detection is the process of com-
paring definitions of what activity is considered normal against observed events to iden-
tify significant deviations. This IDS uses profiles that represent the normal behavior of
such things as users, hosts, network connections, or applications. The profiles are devel-
oped by monitoring the characteristics of typical activity over a period of time. An initial
profile is generated over a period of time (typically days or weeks) sometimes called a
training period. Profiles for anomaly-based detection can either be static or dynamic.
Once generated, a static profile is unchanged unless the IDS is specifically directed to
generate a new profile. A dynamic profile is adjusted constantly as additional events are
observed. Because systems and networks change over time, the corresponding measures
of normal behavior also change; a static profile will eventually become inaccurate, so it
needs to be regenerated periodically. Dynamic profiles do not have this problem, but they
are susceptible to evasion attempts from attackers. For example, an attacker can perform
small amounts of malicious activity occasionally, then slowly increase the frequency and
quantity of activity. If the rate of change is sufficiently slow, the IDS might think the
malicious activity is normal behavior and include it in its profile. So, the anomaly based
IDS depends on the knowledge of the attacks. This is a robust approach and very ef-
fective at detecting previously unknown threats, but it is more difficult to research good
model in order to describe normal actions in heterogeneous contexts.
An other classification of IDS based on the type of sensor is the following:
Network-based: The sensors are placed at strategic points on the internal network and
it is very important that the sniffer can be as invisible and transparent to the attacker
which, otherwise, could take countermeasures, which is why the network interfaces of
the sensors are configured in stealth mode that operate without IP address, and without
sending any traffic. These IDSs have the inherent advantage of being independent from
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the operating system because they need packages coming from the network and not a
resource or as a specific machine. Moreover, their development will not impact the
structure of the existing network as it is to place the sensor (usually a purely passive)
in strategic nodes. This causes the operating costs are relatively low, as there are few
modules to maintain. However, this apparent advantage has also its drawbacks because
these IDSs can only detect attacks visible on the network segment. If for example, the
signature of a certain attack was encrypted, then the IDS would not be able to find it.
From the performance point of view, if these systems need to try to detect fragmented
attacks, the complexity required by the reconstruction is a theoretical problem rather
than a real one (this operation being feasible in theory only, with a processor to arbitrary
power).
Host-based: These systems analyze activities with great level of detail and accuracy to
determine the exact processes involved in a particular attack. Unlike network-based IDS,
host-based ones can directly observe the effects of an intrusion since they have access
and monitor the files and processes that are normally the intended target of such attacks.
When implementing a host-based IDS, being strongly dependent on the operating sys-
tem, development and deployment costs are higher than a network-based IDS ones, as
it requires the installation and configuration on multiple machines, often heterogeneous.
This is ill-suited to today’s network based computer systems, deep and highly distributed
with equal information sources.
Finally, we can classify the IDS in:
On-line: systems that analyze the data while actions occur. They are called real-time
to indicate that the IDS is designed to handle a certain stream of data without losing
packets, and without getting a buffer waiting to be verified.
Off-line: systems that analyze the data retrospectively. The general tendency is to con-
sider the latter more as a tool of computer forensics, that is the verification of intrusion
with general purposes of the judicial police, then intrusion detection.
A relatively innovation in this area are in-line systems that are often called Intrusion
Prevention System (IPS). In essence, if the IDS is in-line, it is positioned as a firewall or
a switch on the path of the packages and its main function is to be able to act as a filter as
well as an analyzer, while the traditional IDS are usually placed on a network port that
has a copy of all traffic.
In summary, signature-based methods have been used extensively to detect malicious
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activities. On the other hand, in profile-based methods, a known deviation from the norm
is considered anomalous (e.g. HTTP traffic on a non-standard port).
In contrast, in this thesis, we consider the case where we have a set A of known ac-
tivities (both innocuous and dangerous)—and we are looking for observation sequences
that cannot be explained by either (if they were, they would constitute patterns that were
known a priori). These need to be flagged as they might represent “zero day” attacks—
attacks that were never seen before and vary significantly from past known access pat-
terns.
2.2.2 Correlation techniques
Since Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS) are increasingly deployed in the network, they
could generate an overwhelming number of alerts with true alerts mixed with false ones.
Most of these alerts are raised independently, making it very hard for the network ad-
ministrator or intrusion response system to understand the real security situation of the
network and provide response to the intrusions. Consequently, alert correlation has be-
come a critical process in intrusion detection and response.
Alert correlation [43] can be very beneficial especially for intrusion response. Firstly,
it reduces the volume of alerts that needs to be handled. IDSs may generate thousands of
alerts per day. One of the main tasks of alert correlation is to aggregate duplicate alerts
and filter low-interest alerts. After these steps, the number of alerts that are presented to
network administrators will be greatly reduced.
Secondly, due to the problem of false positives, it is impossible to respond to every
alert that is reported by IDS. Only those which are detected with high confidence will be
considered for response action. Alert correlation provides a way to increase the detection
confidence. Generally speaking, correlated alerts are less likely to be false alerts, because
they suggest the preparation or continuation of attacks. It is rare for a legitimate user to
trigger multiple alerts, and at the same time, these alerts are correlated as different stages
of an attack. On the other hand, if we get multiple correlated alerts, and they fall into
different stages of an attack, such as scanning, remote to local, denial of service (DoS),
then the possibility of these alerts being true alerts should be higher than the case that
these alerts are independent. Normally, for attacks that have great security impact on
the protected network such as DoS and worms, response actions will be taken without
observing any correlated alerts, because these kinds of attack themselves are not likely
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to be false alerts due to their complexity. Moreover, their severity is high and therefore
should be handled with high priority. However, there are cases where certain types of
alerts can have a high false positive rate, such as password-guessing. In that case, if a
response unit receives such an uncorrelated alert, it knows that it could be a false alert,
and considering its severity, it might choose not to respond at this time. But, if it receives
this alert right after it receives a port scan alert from the same source targeting the same
host, it will have higher confidence that this is a true alert and therefore take appropriate
response actions.
Thirdly, correlated alerts provide a succinct, high-level view of the security state of
the network under surveillance. By knowing the security state, the network administrator
can make an appropriate plan to respond to intrusions. Consider a situation in which one
single host in the network is infected by a certain type of worm, and the situation that
multiple hosts in different subnets are infected in a short period of time indicating the
spreading of the worm. The response action with respect to these two different situations
can be totally different: In the former case, he might just need to disconnect the host
from the network, and remove the malicious program. In the latter case, he might also
need to modify the firewall rules to block the corresponding type of traffic in order to
prevent the worm from spreading outside the network.
Another important use of alert correlation is to recognize the strategies or plans of
different intrusions and infer the goal of attacks. Suppose that the next step or the final
goal of an attacker can be identified by looking at the pattern of the intrusive behavior,
we can take actions to prevent the attack from escalating and therefore minimize the
damage to the asset. Alert correlation provides some means to group different logically-
connected alerts into attack scenarios.
Alert correlation is defined as a process that contains multiple components with the
purpose of analyzing alerts and providing high-level insight on the security state of the
network under surveillance.
In summary, the goal of correlation is to find causal relationships between alerts in
order to reconstruct attacks from isolated alerts. This goal is achieved by providing a
higher level view of the actual attacks [44, 45, 39, 48, 49, 50].
From a conceptual point of view, both intrusion detection systems and alert corre-
lation methods aggregate fine grained information into higher level views of the attack,
although they operate at different levels of abstraction, as shown in Figure 2.4. Moreover,
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Figure 2.4: Conceptual diagram in cyber security domain
both rely on models encoding a priori knowledge of either normal or malicious behav-
ior, and cannot appropriately deal with events that are not explained by the underlying
models. In practice, all these methods are incapable of quantifying how well available
models explain a sequence of events observed in data streams (data packets and alerts
respectively) feeding the two classes of tools.
However, the framework and algorithms proposed for identifying unexplained activ-
ities are domain independent and may be applied to any domain including both activity
detection in video and in cyber-security.

Chapter 3
Activity Detection Models
3.1 Basic Activity Model
The aim of this section is to define a new method to model well-known activities. Such
a goal has been achieved by extending the stochastic activity model of [1] adding a
function δ which expresses a constraint on the maximum “temporal distance” between
two actions in an activity (though we make no claims of novelty for this).
We assume the existence of a finite set S of action symbols, corresponding to ob-
servable atomic actions. For instance, in the video domain, action symbols might be
recognized by sophisticated image processing algorithms, while in the cyber-security
domain, they may simply be read from a log file. Though our unexplained sequence de-
tection framework is domain-independent, in some domains such as video surveillance,
the problem of recognizing low-level actions in video can be a big challenge: for this
reason, we embedded the Unexplained Activity Detector into complete prototype imple-
mentations we designed and implemented (starting from the output of cameras/sensors
for the video surveillance context and from the packets for the cyber security one) in
order to make a complete experimentation on real-world datasets on both the considered
contexts. We will describe in details the whole followed process in Chapter 5.
Definition 3.1.1 (Stochastic activity) A stochastic activity is a labeled directed graph
A = (V,E, δ, ρ) where
• V is a finite set of nodes labeled with action symbols from S;
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Figure 3.1: Example of stochastic activity: ATM deposit
• E ⊆ V × V is a set of edges;
• δ : E → N+ associates, with each edge 〈vi, vj〉, an upper bound on the time that
can elapse between vi and vj;
• ρ is a function that associates, with each node v ∈ V having out-degree 1 or more,
a probability distribution on {〈v, v′〉 | 〈v, v′〉 ∈ E}, i.e., ∑
〈v,v′〉∈E
ρ(〈v, v′〉) = 1;
• there exists at least one start node in the activity definition, i.e. {v ∈ V | @ v′ ∈
V s.t. 〈v′, v〉 ∈ E} 6= ∅;
• there exists at least one end node in the activity definition, i.e. {v ∈ V | @ v′ ∈
V s.t. 〈v, v′〉 ∈ E} 6= ∅.
Figure 3.1 shows a stochastic activity of deposits at an Automatic Teller Machine
(ATM). Each edge e is labeled with (δ(e), ρ(e)). For an edge e = 〈s1, s2〉, δ(e) specifies
the maximum time between when s1 is observed and when s2 is observed. ρ specifies
the probability of going from one node to another (the probability distribution associated
with a node gives the transition probability from that node). For instance, the two edges
starting at node insertCard mean that there is a 50% probability of going to node in-
sertChecks and a 50% probability of going to node insertCash from node insertCard.
In addition, insertChecks and insertCash must follow insertCard within 2 and 1 time
units, respectively.
In general, each node of a stochastic activity definition is something that can be de-
tected by application code. For instance, if we are tracking activities in video, each node
in a stochastic activity would be something that can be detected by an image processing
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program, e.g. “Detect Person” in Figure 3.1 may be identified as holding only if a prob-
abilistic face recognition program returns a probability over some threshold that a given
frame (or block of frames) contains a face in it. Likewise, in a cybersecurity application,
a node in an activity such as “Attempted login” may only be identified as occurring if
a log file archives a login attempt. For the sake of simplicity, we use “high level” de-
scriptions of nodes in our examples, as opposed to low level descriptions (e.g., the color
histogram of a given image shows over 70% of the colors are a certain shade).
An instance of a stochastic activity A is a path in A from a start node to an end node.
Definition 3.1.2 (Stochastic activity instance) An instance of a stochastic activity (V,E, δ, ρ)
is a sequence 〈s1, . . . , sm〉 of nodes in V such that
• 〈si, si+1〉 ∈ E for 1 ≤ i < m;
• {s | 〈s, s1〉 ∈ E} = ∅, i.e., s1 is a start node; and
• {s | 〈sm, s〉 ∈ E} = ∅, i.e., sm is an end node.
The probability of the instance is
∏m−1
i=1 ρ(〈si, si+1〉).
In Figure 3.1, 〈detectPerson, insertCard, insertCash, withdrawCard〉 is an instance
with probability 0.35. Throughout the thesis, we assume an arbitrary but fixed set A of
stochastic activities.
The preceding definitions do not take observation sequences into account. In order to
define when activity occurrences are detected in a sequence of time-stamped observation
data, we first need to formally define an observation sequence. An observation sequence
is a finite sequence of observation IDs. An observation ID (OID) f has an associated
timestamp, denoted f.ts, and an associated set of action symbols, denoted f.obs. With-
out loss of generality, we assume timestamps to be positive integers. For instance, if our
observation sequence is a video, then the OIDs may be frame IDs with f.ts being the
timestamp associated with frame f and f.obs being the actions detected in frame f . On
the other hand, if our observation sequence is a sequence of transactions at a website, the
OIDs are transaction IDs, f.ts is the timestamp associated with transaction f , and f.obs
are the actions associated with transaction f .
28 3 Activity Detection Models
Example 3.1.1 (Video example) An observation sequence might be a video v = 〈f1, f2, f3, f4, f5〉,
where the fi’s are frame IDs, fi.ts = i for 1 ≤ i ≤ 5, f1.obs = {detectPerson},
f2.obs = {insertCard}, f3.obs = {insertCash}, f4.obs = {withdrawCash}, f5.obs =
{withdrawCard}. Notice that withdrawCash in frame f4 does not appear in the stochas-
tic activity of Figure 3.1. In general, action symbols may be detected in a frame even
if they do not appear in the definition of a stochastic activity because it is irrelevant for
that activity.
Throughout the thesis, we use the following terminology and notation for (general)
sequences. Suppose S1 = 〈a1, . . . , an〉 and S2 = 〈b1, . . . , bm〉 are two sequences. S2
is a subsequence of S1 iff there exist 1 ≤ j1 < j2 < · · · < jm ≤ n s.t. bi = aji for
1 ≤ i ≤ m. If ji = ji+1 − 1 for 1 ≤ i < m, then S2 is a contiguous subsequence of
S1. We write S1 ∩ S2 6= ∅ iff S1 and S2 have a common element and write e ∈ S1
iff e is an element appearing in S1. The concatenation of S1 and S2, i.e., the sequence
〈a1, . . . , an, b1, . . . , bm〉, is denoted by S1 · S2. Finally, |S1| denotes the number of
elements in S1.
We now define an occurrence of a stochastic activity in an observation sequence.
Definition 3.1.3 (Activity occurrence) Let v be an observation sequence andA=(V,E, δ, ρ)
a stochastic activity. An occurrence o of A in v is a sequence 〈(f1, s1), . . . , (fm, sm)〉
such that
• 〈f1, . . . , fm〉 is a subsequence of v,
• 〈s1, . . . , sm〉 is an instance of A,
• si ∈ fi.obs, for 1 ≤ i ≤ m, and 1
• fi+1.ts− fi.ts ≤ δ(〈si, si+1〉), for 1 ≤ i < m.
The probability of o, denoted p(o), is the probability of the instance 〈s1, . . . , sm〉.
When concurrently monitoring multiple activities, shorter activity instances gener-
ally tend to have higher probability. To remedy this, we normalize occurrence proba-
bilities by introducing the relative probability p∗(o) of an occurrence o of activity A as
p∗(o) = p(o)pmax , where pmax is the highest probability of any instance of A.
1With a slight abuse of notation, we use si to refer to both node si and the action symbol labeling it.
3.2 UAP Model 29
Example 3.1.2 (Video example) Consider the video of Example 3.1.1. An occurrence
of the activity of Figure 3.1 is o = 〈(f1, detectPerson), (f2, insertCard), (f3, insertCash),
(f5,withdrawCard)〉, and p∗(o) = 0.875. Notice that if the edge going from insertCash
to withdrawCard was labeled with 1 by δ, then o would not have been an activity oc-
currence because withdrawCard was required to follow insertCash within at most 1 time
unit, whereas it occurs after 2 time units in the video.
We use O(v) to denote the set of all activity occurrences in v. Whenever v is clear
from the context, we write O instead of O(v).
Next section (3.2) describes our framework for discovering unexplained activities in
an application-independent manner. It is worth noting that the actual input of the frame-
work consists of an observation sequence and a set of activity occurrences (each with a
probability). Though our framework is domain-independent, there can be challenges in
providing the observations associated with OIDs in some domains (e.g. video surveil-
lance, where identifying the low level actions in a video frame can be highly non-trivial):
we have built a specific and complete prototype implementation to address this problem
in video surveillance context, as described in Chapter 5.
3.2 UAP Model
This section defines the probability that an observation sequence is unexplained by A.
We note that the occurrence of an activity in an observation sequence can involve con-
flicts. For instance, consider the activity occurrence o in Example 3.1.2 and suppose
there is a second activity occurrence o′ such that (f1, detectPerson) ∈ o′. In this case,
there is an implicit conflict because (f1, detectPerson) belongs to both occurrences, but
in fact, detectPerson can only belong to one activity occurrence, i.e. though o and o′
may both have a non-zero probability, the probability that these two activity occurrences
coexist is 0. Formally, we say two activity occurrences o, o′ conflict, denoted o  o′, iff
o ∩ o′ 6= ∅. We now use this to define possible worlds.
Definition 3.2.1 (Possible world) Let O be the set of all activity occurrences in an ob-
servation sequence v. A possible world for v is a subset w ofO s.t. @oi, oj ∈ w, oi  oj .
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Thus, a possible world is a set of activity occurrences which do not conflict with one
another, i.e., an action symbol in an OID cannot belong to two distinct activity occur-
rences in the same world. We use W(v) to denote the set of all possible worlds for an
observation sequence v; whenever v is clear from the context, we simply writeW .
Example 3.2.1 (Video example) Consider a video with two conflicting occurrences o1, o2.
There are 3 possible worlds: w0 = ∅, w1 = {o1}, and w2 = {o2}. Note that {o1, o2}
is not a world as o1  o2. Each world represents a way of explaining what is observed.
The first world corresponds to the case where nothing is explained, the second and third
worlds correspond to the scenarios where we use one of the two possible occurrences to
explain the observed action symbols.
Note that any subset of O not containing conflicting occurrences is a legitimate pos-
sible world—possible worlds are not required to be maximal w.r.t. ⊆. In the above
example, the empty set is a possible world even though there are two other possible
worlds w1 = {o1} and w2 = {o2} which are supersets of it. The reason is that o1 and
o2 are uncertain, so the scenario where neither o1 nor o2 occurs is a legitimate one. We
illustrate this below.
Example 3.2.2 (Video example) Suppose we have a video where a single occurrence
o has p∗(o) = 0.6. In this case, it is natural to say that there are two possible worlds
w0 = ∅ and w1 = {o} and expect the probabilities of w0 and w1 to be 0.4 and 0.6,
respectively. By restricting ourselves to maximal possible worlds only, we would have
only one possible world, w1, whose probability is 1, which is wrong.
It is worth noting that the problem of finding possible worlds corresponds to the
problem of finding the independent sets of a graph: occurrences are vertices, conflicts
are edges, possible worlds are independent sets. Thus, algorithms to find maximal inde-
pendent sets can be directly applied to compute possible worlds—all possible worlds can
be simply obtained by taking all subsets of the maximal independent sets. An efficient
algorithm for generating all the maximal independent sets has been proposed in [51],
processing time and memory space are bounded by O(nmµ) and O(n + m), respec-
tively, where n, m, and µ are the numbers of vertices (occurrences in our case), edges
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(conflicts in our case), and maximal independent sets (possible worlds in our case) of a
graph.
We use ∗ to denote the transitive closure of . Clearly, ∗ is an equivalence relation
and determines a partition ofO into equivalence classesO1, . . . ,Om. Here the basic idea
is to partition the observation sequence into subsequences containing occurrences that
conflict directly or in a “transitive” way (we will formally define this with the notion of a
Conflict-Based Partitioning in Definition 3.2.2 and illustrate it in Example 3.2.4). Equiv-
alence classes that temporally overlap are collapsed into a single one. Two equivalence
classesOi andOj temporally overlap iff [min(Oi),max(Oi)]∩[min(Oj),max(Oj)] 6=
0, where min(Oi) = min{f.ts | ∃o ∈ Oi, (f, s) ∈ o}, max(Oi) = max{f.ts | ∃o ∈
Oi, (f, s) ∈ o}, and min(Oj), max(Oj) are analogously defined.
Example 3.2.3 (Video example) Suppose we have a video v = 〈f1, . . . , f16〉 s.t. five
occurrences o1, o2, o3, o4, o5 are detected as depicted in Figure 3.2, that is, o1  o2,
o2  o3, and o4  o5. There are two equivalence classes determined by
∗, namely
O1 = {o1, o2, o3} and O2 = {o4, o5}.
f1 f2 f3 f4 f5 f6 f7 f8 f9 f10 f11 f12 f13 f14 f15 f16
o1 o3 o4
o2 o5
Figure 3.2: Conflict-Based Partitioning of a video
The equivalence classes determined by ∗ lead to a conflict-based partitioning of an
observation sequence.
Definition 3.2.2 (Conflict-Based Partitioning) Let v be an observation sequence and
O1, . . . ,Om the equivalence classes determined by ∗. A Conflict-Based Partitioning
(CBP) of v is a sequence 〈v1, . . . , vm〉 such that:
• v1 · · · · · vm = v, and
• O(vi) = Oi, for 1 ≤ i ≤ m.
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The vi’s are called segments.
Example 3.2.4 (Video example) A CBP of the video in Example 3.2.3 is 〈v1, v2〉, where
v1 = 〈f1, . . . , f9〉 and v2 = 〈f10, . . . , f16〉. Another partitioning of the same video is the
one where v1 = 〈f1, . . . , f10〉 and v2 = 〈f11, . . . , f16〉.
Thus, activity occurrences determine a set of possible worlds (different ways of ex-
plaining an observation sequence). We wish to find a probability distribution over all pos-
sible worlds that (i) is consistent with the relative probabilities of the occurrences, and (ii)
takes conflicts into account. We assume the user specifies a function Weight : A → R+
which assigns a weight to each activity and prioritizes the importance of the activity. For
instance, highly threatening activities may be assigned a high weight. The weight of an
occurrence o of activity A is the weight of A. We use C(o) to denote the set of occur-
rences conflicting with o, i.e., C(o) = {o′ | o′ ∈ O ∧ o′  o}. Note that o ∈ C(o); and
C(o) = {o} when o does not conflict with any other occurrence. Finally, we assume that
activity occurrences belonging to different segments are independent events. Suppose
pw denotes the (unknown) probability of world w. As we know the probability of occur-
rences, and as each occurrence occurs in certain worlds, we can induce a set of nonlinear
constraints that will subsequently be used to learn the values of the pw’s.
Definition 3.2.3 Let v be an observation sequence and O1, . . . ,Om the equivalence
classes determined by ∗. We define the non-linear constraints NLC(v) as follows:
pw ≥ 0, ∀w ∈ W∑
w∈W
pw = 1∑
w∈W s.t. o∈w
pw = p
∗(o) · Weight(o)∑
oj∈C(o)Weight(oj)
,∀o ∈ O
pw =
m∏
k=1
∑
w′∈W s.t. w′∩Ok=w∩Ok
pw′ ∀w ∈ W
The first two types of constraints enforce a probability distribution over the set of pos-
sible worlds. The third type of constraint ensures that the probability of occurrence o—
which is the sum of the probabilities of the worlds containing o—is equal to its relative
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probability p∗(o) weighted by Weight(o)∑
oj∈C(o)Weight(oj)
. Note that: (i) the value on the right-
hand side of the third type of constraint decreases as the amount of conflict increases,
(ii) if an occurrence o is not conflicting with any other occurrence, then its probability∑
w∈W s.t. o∈w pw is equal to p
∗(o), i.e., the probability returned by the stochastic au-
tomaton. The last kind of constraint reflects independence between segments. In general
NLC(v) might admit multiple solutions.
Example 3.2.5 (Video example) Consider a single-segment video consisting of frames
f1, . . . , f9 (cf. Figure 3.2). Suppose o1, o2, o3 have been detected with relative prob-
abilities 0.3, 0.6, and 0.5, respectively. Suppose the weights of o1, o2, o3 are 1, 2, 3,
respectively. Five worlds are possible: w0=∅, w1 = {o1}, w2 = {o2}, w3 = {o3}, and
w4 = {o1, o3}. Then, NLC(v) is:
pi ≥ 0 0 ≤ i ≤ 4
p0 + p1 + p2 + p3 + p4 = 1
p1 + p4 = 0.3 · 13
p2 = 0.6 · 13
p3 + p4 = 0.5 · 35
which has multiple solutions.
For brevity, we do not explicitly list the independence constraints.
One solution is p0 = 0.4, p1 = 0.1, p2 = 0.2, p3 = 0.3, p4 = 0. Another solution is
p0 = 0.5, p1 = 0, p2 = 0.2, p3 = 0.2, p4 = 0.1.
In the rest of the thesis, we assume that NLC(v) is solvable. This can be easily
checked via both a non-linear constraint solver, as well as methods developed in next
subsection (3.2.1). We say that a sequence S = 〈(f1, s1), . . . , (fn, sn)〉 occurs in an
observation sequence v iff 〈f1, . . . , fn〉 is a contiguous subsequence of v and si ∈ fi.obs
for 1 ≤ i ≤ n. We give two semantics for S to be unexplained in a world w ∈ W .
Intuitively, S is totally (resp. partially) unexplained in w iff w does not explain every
(resp. at least one) symbol of S. More formally:
1. S is totally unexplained in w, denoted w2TS, iff ∀(fi, si) ∈ S, @o ∈ w, (fi, si) ∈
o;
2. S is partially unexplained inw, denotedw2PS, iff ∃(fi, si) ∈ S,@o ∈ w, (fi, si) ∈
o.
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Example 3.2.6 (Video example) Suppose we have a video v = 〈f1, . . . , f9〉 such that
fi.obs = {si}, 1 ≤ i ≤ 9, and two occurrences o1 and o2 are detected (cf. Figure 3.3).
(f1,s1) (f2,s2) (f3,s3) (f4,s4) (f5,s5) (f6,s6) (f7,s7) (f8,s8) (f9,s9) 
o1 o2 
S1 
S2 
S3 
Figure 3.3: Totally and partially unexplained sequences
The four possible worlds are: w0 = ∅, w1 = {o1}, w2 = {o2}, w3 = {o1, o2}.
Let S1 = 〈(f4, s4), (f5, s5)〉, S2 = 〈(f3, s3), (f4, s4)〉, S3 = 〈(f2, s2), (f3, s3)〉 be se-
quences occurring in v. S1 is totally (and partially) unexplained in every world. S2 is
totally unexplained in w0 and w2 but not in w1 and w3; moreover, S2 is partially unex-
plained in every world. S3 is totally and partially unexplained in w0 and w2 but not in
w1 and w3.
We now define the probability of a sequence in an observation sequence being total-
ly/partially unexplained.
Definition 3.2.4 Let S be a sequence occurring in an observation sequence v. The prob-
ability interval that S is totally unexplained in v is IT (S) = [l, u], where:
l = minimize
∑
w∈W s.t. w2TS pw
subject to NLC(v)
u = maximize
∑
w∈W s.t. w2TS pw
subject to NLC(v)
The probability interval that S is partially unexplained in v is IP (S) = [l′, u′], where
l′, u′ are derived in exactly the same way as l, u above by replacing the 2T symbols in
the above optimization problems by 2P .
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Thus, the probability that a sequence S occurring in v is totally (resp. partially)
unexplained w.r.t. a solution of NLC(v) is the sum of the probabilities of the worlds
in which S is totally (resp. partially) unexplained. As NLC(v) may have multiple
solutions, we find the tightest interval [l, u] (resp. [l′, u′]) containing this probability
for any solution. Different criteria can be used to infer a value from an interval [l, u],
e.g. the MIN l, the MAX u, the average (i.e., (l + u)/2), etc. The only requirement
is that this value has to be in [l, u]. We henceforth assume that such criterion has been
chosen—PT (S) (resp. PP (S)) denotes the probability that S is totally (resp. partially)
unexplained.
The following proposition says that the probability that a sequence is totally (resp.
partially) unexplained is no higher (resp. lower) than the probability of any subsequence.
Proposition 3.2.1 Consider two sequences S1 and S2 occurring in an observation se-
quence. If S1 is a subsequence of S2, then PT (S1) ≥ PT (S2) and PP (S1) ≤ PP (S2).
We now define totally and partially unexplained sequences.
Definition 3.2.5 (Unexplained sequences) Let v be an observation sequence, τ ∈ [0, 1]
a probability threshold, and L ∈ N+ a length threshold. A sequence S occuring in v is:
• A totally unexplained sequence if (i) PT (S) ≥ τ , (ii) |S| ≥ L, and (iii) S is
maximal, i.e., there is no sequence S′ 6= S occurring in v s.t. S is a subsequence
of S′, PT (S′) ≥ τ , and |S′| ≥ L.
• A partially unexplained sequence if (i) PP (S) ≥ τ , (ii) |S| ≥ L, and (iii) S is
minimal, i.e., there is no sequence S′ 6= S occurring in v s.t. S′ is a subsequence
of S, PP (S′) ≥ τ , and |S′| ≥ L.
In this definition, L is the minimum length a sequence must be for it to be considered
possibly unexplained. Totally unexplained sequences S have to be maximal because
once we find S, any sub-sequence of it is (totally) unexplained with probability greater
than or equal to that of S. On the other hand, partially unexplained sequences S′ have to
be minimal because once we find S′, any super-sequence of it is (partially) unexplained
with probability greater than or equal to that of S′.
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Intuitively, an unexplained sequence is a sequence of action symbols that are ob-
served in the observation sequence and poorly explained by known activity models. Such
sequences might correspond to unknown variants of known activities or to entirely new—
and unknown—activities. So, in this way, we can discover new activities not sufficiently
explained by the well-known models and that can be further analyzed by final users.
An Unexplained Activity Problem (UAP) instance is a triple I = 〈v, τ, L〉 where
v is an observation sequence, τ ∈ [0, 1] is a probability threshold, and L ∈ N+ is a
length threshold. We want to find the sets Atu(I) and Apu(I) of all totally and partially
unexplained activities, respectively. When I is clear from context, we will drop it.
The following definition introduces the top-k totally and partially unexplained activ-
ities. Intuitively, these are k unexplained activities having maximum probability.
Definition 3.2.6 (Top-k unexplained activities) Consider a UAP instance and let k ∈
N+. Atuk ⊆ Atu (resp. Apuk ⊆ Apu) is a set of top-k totally (resp. partially) un-
explained activities iff |Atuk | = min{k, |Atu|} (resp. |Apuk | = min{k, |Apu|}), and
∀S ∈ Atuk , ∀S′ ∈ Atu − Atuk (resp. ∀S ∈ Apuk , ∀S′ ∈ Apu − Apuk ) PT (S) ≥ PT (S′)
(resp. PP (S) ≥ PP (S′)).
Suppose we have a UAP instance. For any S, S′ ∈ Atu (resp. S, S′ ∈ Apu), we
write S =T S′ (resp. S =P S′) iff PT (S) = PT (S′) (resp. PP (S) = PP (S′)).
Obviously, =T (resp. =P ) is an equivalence relation and determines a set Ctu (resp. Cpu)
of equivalence classes. For any equivalence class C ∈ Ctu (resp. C ∈ Cpu) we define
PT (C) (resp. PP (C)) as the (unique) probability of the sequences in C.
Compared with the top-k unexplained activities, the top−k unexplained classes find
all the unexplained sequences having the k highest probabilities.
Definition 3.2.7 (Top-k unexplained classes) Consider a UAP instance and let k ∈
N+. Ctuk ⊆ Ctu (resp. Cpuk ⊆ Cpu) is the set of top-k totally (resp. partially) unex-
plained classes iff |Ctuk | = min{k, |Ctu|} (resp. |Cpuk | = min{k, |Cpu|}), and ∀C ∈
Ctuk , ∀C ′ ∈ Ctu − Ctuk (resp. ∀C ∈ Cpuk , ∀C ′ ∈ Cpu − Cpuk ) PT (C) > PT (C ′) (resp.
PP (C) > PP (C ′)).
Table 3.1 summarizes the main notation used in the thesis.
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Symbol Description
A Set of stochastic activities
s Action symbol
f Observation ID (OID)
f.ts Timestamp associated with observation ID f
f.obs Set of action symbols associated with observation ID
f
v Observation sequence
o andO Activity occurrence and set of activity occurrences
w andW Possible world and set of possible worlds
〈v1, . . . , vm〉 Conflict-based partitioning (CBP) of observation se-
quence v. Each vi is called a segment
NLC(v) Set of non-linear constraints for observation sequence
v
LC(v) Set of linear constraints for observation sequence v
w2TS Sequence S is totally unexplained in world w
w2PS Sequence S is partially unexplained in world w
IT (S) Probability interval that sequence S is totally unex-
plained
IP (S) Probability interval that sequence S is partially unex-
plained
PT (S) (Point) Probability that sequence S is totally unex-
plained
PP (S) (Point) Probability that sequence S is partially unex-
plained
Table 3.1: Notation
3.2.1 Properties
This subsection derives properties that can be leveraged (in chapter 4) to devise efficient
algorithms to solve UAPs. We first show an interesting property concerning the solution
of NLC(v) (some later results rely on it); the following two sections consider specific
properties for totally and partially unexplained activities.
For a given observation sequence v, we show that if 〈v1, . . . , vm〉 is a CBP, then we
can find solutions of the non-linear constraints NLC(v) by solving m smaller sets of
linear constraints.
This yields some benefits:
• It allows us to solve a smaller set of constraints.
• It allows us to solve linear constraints which are easier to solve than nonlinear
ones.
• Moreover, it allows us to drastically reduce the space of possible worlds consid-
ered, as we can consider each segment vi (and its corresponding possible worlds)
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individually, thereby avoiding the blow up we would get by combining possible
worlds of different segments. This also applies to Theorems 2 and 4.
Let LC(v) be the set of linear constraints of NLC(v) (i.e., all constraints of Defi-
nition 3.2.3 except for the last kind). Henceforth, we useW to denoteW(v) andWi to
denoteW(vi), 1 ≤ i ≤ m. A solution of NLC(v) is a mapping P : W → [0, 1] which
satisfies NLC(v). Likewise, a solution of LC(vi) is a mapping Pi :Wi → [0, 1] which
satisfiesLC(vi). It is important to note thatW = {w1∪· · ·∪wm |wi ∈ Wi, 1 ≤ i ≤ m}.
Theorem 1 Let v be an observation sequence and 〈v1, . . . , vm〉 a CBP. P is a solution
of NLC(v) iff ∀i ∈ [1,m] there exists a solution Pi of LC(vi) s.t. P(
⋃m
i=1wi) =∏m
i=1 Pi(wi) for every w1 ∈ W1, . . . , wm ∈ Wm.
The following example illustrates the previous theorem.
Example 3.2.7 (Video example) Consider the video v of Example 3.2.3 (cf. Figure 3.2).
As shown in Example 3.2.4, one possible CBP of v is 〈v1, v2〉, where v1 = 〈f1, . . . , f9〉
and v2 = 〈f10, . . . , f16〉. Theorem 1 says that for each solution P of NLC(v), there is a
solution P1 of LC(v1) and a solution P2 of LC(v2) s.t. P(w1∪w2) = P1(w1)×P(w2)
for every w1 ∈ W1, w2 ∈ W2, and vice versa.
Consider an observation sequence v and let 〈v1, . . . , vm〉 be a CBP. Given a sequence
S = 〈(f1, s1), . . . , (fq, sq)〉 occurring in v, we say that vi, vi+1, . . . , vi+n (1 ≤ i ≤
i+ n ≤ m) are the segments containing S iff f1 ∈ vi and fq ∈ vi+n. In other words, S
spans the segments vi, vi+1, . . . , vi+n: it starts at a point in segment vi (as vi contains the
first OID of S) and ends at some point in segment vi+n (as vi+n contains the last OID of
S). Sk denotes the projection of S on the k-th segment vk (i ≤ k ≤ i + n), that is, the
subsequence of S containing all the pairs (f, s) ∈ S with f ∈ vk.
Example 3.2.8 (Video example) Suppose we have a video v = 〈f1, . . . , f21〉 such that
fi.obs = {si} for 1 ≤ i ≤ 21. In addition, suppose 8 occurrences are detected as
shown in Figure 3.4. Consider the CBP 〈v1, v2, v3, v4〉, where v1 = {f1, . . . , f5},
v2 = {f6, . . . , f10}, v3 = {f11, . . . , f16}, and v4 = {f17, . . . , f21}. Consider now
the sequence S = 〈(f8, s8), . . . , (f14, s14)〉 occurring in v. Then, v2 and v3 are the
segments containing S. Moreover, S2 denotes 〈(f8, s8), . . . , (f10, s10)〉, and S3 denotes
〈(f11, s11), . . . , (f14, s14)〉.
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f1 f2 f3 f4 f5 f6 f7 f8 f9 f12 f13 f14 f15 f16 f17 f18 f19 f20 f21f11f10
S
Figure 3.4: Conflict-Based Partitioning of a video
3.2.1.1 Totally Unexplained Activities
The following theorem says that we can compute IT (S) by solving LC (which are lin-
ear constraints) for each segment containing S (instead of solving a non-linear set of
constraints for the whole observation sequence).
Theorem 2 Consider an observation sequence v. Let 〈v1, . . . , vm〉 be a CBP and 〈vi, . . . , vi+n〉
the segments containing a sequence S occurring in v. For i ≤ k ≤ i+ n, let
lk = minimize
∑
w∈Wk s.t. w2TSk pw
subject to LC(vk)
uk = maximize
∑
w∈Wk s.t. w2TSk pw
subject to LC(vk)
If IT (S) = [l, u], then l =
∏i+n
k=i lk and u =
∏i+n
k=i uk.
The following example illustrates the theorem above.
Example 3.2.9 (Video example) Consider Example 3.2.8, which is depicted in Figure 3.4.
IT (S) can be computed by solving the non-linear program of Definition 3.2.4 for the
whole video v. But Theorem 2 says that IT (S) can be computed as IT (S) = [l2 ×
l3, u2 × u3], where l2, u2, l3, u3 are computed as defined in Theorem 2, i.e. by solving
two smaller linear programs for v2 and v3.
The following theorem provides a sufficient condition for a pair (f, s) not to be in-
cluded in any sequence S occurring in v and having PT (S) ≥ τ .
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Theorem 3 Let 〈v, τ, L〉 be a UAP instance. Given (f, s) s.t. f ∈ v and s ∈ f.obs, let
ε =
∑
o∈O s.t. (f,s)∈o
p∗(o) · Weight(o)∑
oj∈C(o)Weight(oj)
. If ε > 1− τ , then there does not exist
a sequence S occurring in v s.t. (f, s) ∈ S and PT (S) ≥ τ .
If the above condition holds for a pair (f, s), then we say that (f, s) is sufficiently
explained. Note that to check whether a pair (f, s) is sufficiently explained, we do not
need to solve any set of linear or non-linear constraints, since ε is computed by simply
summing the (weighted) probabilities of the occurrences containing (f, s). Thus, this
result yields a further efficiency. An OID f is sufficiently explained iff (f, s) is suffi-
ciently explained for every s ∈ f.obs. If (f, s) is sufficiently explained, then it can be
disregarded when identifying unexplained sequences. Moreover, this may allow us to
disregard entire parts of observation sequences as shown in the example below.
Example 3.2.10 (Video example) Consider a UAP instance 〈v, τ, L〉where v = 〈f1, . . . , f9〉
is s.t. fi.obs = {si} for 1 ≤ i ≤ 9, as depicted in Figure 3.5.
(f6,s6)(f4,s4)(f1,s1) (f2,s2) (f3,s3) (f5,s5) (f7,s7) (f8,s8) (f9,s9)
PDFill PDF Editor
 with Free Writer a
nd Tools
Figure 3.5: Sufficiently explained frames in a video
Suppose L = 3 and (f1, s1), (f4, s4), (f6, s6) are sufficiently explained. Even though
the theorem is applicable to only a few (fi, si) pairs, we see that no unexplained sequence
can be found before f7 as L = 3.
Given a UAP instance I = 〈v, τ, L〉 and a subsequence v′ of v, v′ is relevant iff (i) v′
is a contiguous subsequence of v (ii) |v′| ≥ L, (iii) ∀f ∈ v′, f is not sufficiently explained,
and (iv) v′ is maximal (i.e., there does not exist v′′ 6= v′ s.t. v′ is a subsequence of v′′ and
v′′ satisfies (i), (ii), (iii)). We use relevant(I) to denote the set of relevant observation
subsequences.
Theorem 3 entails that relevant observation subsequences can be individually con-
sidered when looking for totally unexplained sequences because there is no totally unex-
plained sequence spanning two different relevant observation subsequences.
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3.2.1.2 Partially Unexplained Activities
The following theorem states that we can compute IP (S) by solving NLC for the ob-
servation subsequence consisting of the segments containing S (instead of solving NLC
for the whole observation sequence).
Theorem 4 Consider an observation sequence v. Let 〈v1, . . . , vm〉 be a CBP and 〈vi, . . . , vi+n〉
be the segments containing a sequence S occurring in v. Let v∗ = vi · · · · · vi+n. IP (S)
computed w.r.t. v is equal to IP (S) computed w.r.t. v∗.
We now illustrate the use of the preceding theorem.
Example 3.2.11 (Video example) Consider Example 3.2.8 as shown in Figure 3.4. By
definition, IP (S) can be computed by solving the non-linear program of Definition 3.2.4
for the whole video v. Alternatively, Theorem 4 says that IP (S) can be computed by
solving the non-linear program of Definition 3.2.4 for the sub-video v∗ = v2 · v3.

Chapter 4
Unexplained Activity Detection
Algorithms
We now present algorithms to find top-k totally and partially unexplained activities and
classes. For ease of presentation, we assume |f.obs| = 1 for every OID f in an ob-
servation sequence (this makes the algorithms much more concise – generalization to
the case of multiple action symbols per OID is straightforward). It suffices to consider
the different sequences given by the different action symbols. Given an observation se-
quence v = 〈f1, . . . , fn〉, we use v(i, j) (1 ≤ i ≤ j ≤ n) to denote the sequence
S = 〈(fi, si), . . . , (fj , sj)〉, where sk is the only element in fk.obs, i ≤ k ≤ j.
4.1 Top-k TUA and TUC
The Top-k TUA algorithm computes a set of top-k totally unexplained activities in an
observation sequence. Note that:
• at every time, lowest is defined as follows:
lowest =
{
−1 if |TopSol| < k
min{PT (S) | S ∈ TopSol} if |TopSol| = k
• On line 30, “Add S to TopSol” works as follows:
– If |TopSol| < k, then S is added to TopSol;
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– otherwise, a sequence S′ in TopSol having minimum PT (S′) is replaced by
S.
Algorithm 1 Top-k TUA
Input: UAP instance I = 〈v, τ, L〉, k ≥ 1
Output: Top-k totally unexplained activities
1: TopSol = ∅
2: for all v′ ∈ relevant(I) do
3: start = 1; end = L
4: repeat
5: if PT (v′(start, end)) ≥ τ ∧ PT (v′(start, end)) > lowest then
6: end′ = end
7: while end < |v′| do
8: end = min{end+ L, |v′|}
9: if PT (v′(start, end)) < τ then
10: break
11: else
12: if PT (v′(start, end)) ≤ lowest then
13: end = end+ 1
14: go to line 33
15: s = max{end− L, end′}; e = end
16: while e 6= s do
17: mid = d(s+ e)/2e
18: if PT (v′(start,mid)) ≥ τ then
19: if PT (v′(start,mid)) ≤ lowest then
20: end = mid+ 1
21: go to line 33
22: else
23: s = mid
24: else
25: e = mid− 1
26: if start > 1 ∧ PT (v′(start− 1, s)) ≥ τ then
27: end = s+ 1
28: go to line 33
29: else
30: S = v′(start, s); Add S to TopSol
31: start = start+ 1; end = s+ 1
32: else
33: start = start+ 1; end = max{end, start+ L− 1}
34: until end > |v′|
35: return TopSol
Leveraging Theorem 3, Top-k TUA considers only relevant observation subsequences
of v individually (line 2). When it finds a sequence v′(start, end) of length at least L
having a probability of being totally unexplained greater than lowest (line 5), it makes
the sequence maximal by adding OIDs on the right (lines 7–14). Instead of adding one
OID at a time, v′(start, end) is extended by L OIDs at a time until its probability drops
below τ (lines 9–10); a binary search is then performed to find the exact maximum length
of the unexplained sequence (lines 15–25). While making the sequence maximal, if the
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algorithm realizes that the unexplained sequence will not have a probability greater than
lowest (i.e., the sequence is not a top-k TUA), then the sequence is disregarded and
the process of making the sequence maximal is aborted (lines 12–14 and 19–21). This
pruning allows the algorithm to move forward in the observation sequence avoiding com-
puting the exact ending OID of the TUA thereby saving time. Throughout the algorithm,
PT is computed by applying Theorem 2.
Theorem 5 Algorithm Top-k TUA returns a set of top-k totally unexplained activities
of the input instance.
Algorithm Top-k TUC modifies Top-k TUA as follows to compute the top-k totally
unexplained classes:
• At every time, lowest is defined as follows:
lowest =
{
−1 if |TopSol| < k
min{PT (C) | C ∈ TopSol} if |TopSol| = k
• “Add S to TopSol” (line 30) works as follows:
– If there exists C ∈ TopSol s.t. PT (C) = PT (S), then S is added to C;
– else if |TopSol| < k, then the class {S} is added to TopSol;
– otherwise the class C in TopSol having minimum PT (C) is replaced with
{S}.
• On line 5, PT (v′(start, end)) > lowest is replaced with PT (v′(start, end)) ≥
lowest;
• On line 12, PT (v′(start, end)) ≤ lowest is replaced with PT (v′(start, end)) <
lowest;
• On line 19, PT (v′(start,mid)) ≤ lowest is replaced with PT (v′(start,mid)) <
lowest;
The algorithm obtained by applying the modifications above is named Top-k TUC.
Theorem 6 Algorithm Top-k TUC returns the top-k totally unexplained classes of the
input instance.
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4.2 Top-k PUA and PUC
The Top-k PUA algorithm below computes a set of top-k partially unexplained activities
in an observation sequence. Note that:
• at each time, lowest is defined as follows:
lowest =
{
−1 if |TopSol| < k
min{PP (S) | S ∈ TopSol} if |TopSol| = k
• On line 43, “Add S to TopSol” works as follows:
– If |TopSol| < k, then S is added to TopSol;
– otherwise, a sequence in TopSol having minimum PP is replaced by S.
To find an unexplained activity, Algorithm Top-k PUA starts with a sequence of
length at least L and adds OIDs to its right until its probability of being partially un-
explained is above the threshold. As in the case of Top-k TUA, this is done by adding
L OIDs at a time (lines 5–8) and then performing a binary search (lines 9–27). When
performing the binary search, if at some point the algorithm realizes that the partially
unexplained sequence will not have a probability greater than lowest, then the sequence
is disregarded and the binary search is aborted (lines 17–19 and lines 24–25). Otherwise,
the sequence is shortened on the left making it minimal (lines 28–38) by performing a
binary search instead of proceeding one OID at a time. If the algorithm realizes that the
partially unexplained sequence will not have a probability greater than lowest, then the
sequence is disregarded and the shortening process is aborted (lines 34–36). This allows
the algorithm to avoid computing the exact starting OID of the PUS, thus saving time.
Note that PP is computed by applying Theorem 4.
Theorem 7 Algorithm Top-k PUA returns the set of top-k partially unexplained activi-
ties of the input instance.
Algorithm Top-k PUC modifies Top-k PUA as follows to compute the top-k par-
tially unexplained classes:
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Algorithm 2 Top-k PUA
Input: UAP instance I = 〈v, τ, L〉, k ≥ 1
Output: Top-k partially unexplained activities
1: TopSol = ∅; start = 1; end = L
2: while end ≤ |v| do
3: if PP (v(start, end)) < τ then
4: end′ = end
5: while end < |v| do
6: end = min{end+ L, |v|}
7: if PP (v(start, end)) ≥ τ then
8: break
9: if PP (v(start, end)) ≥ τ then
10: if PP (v(start, end)) > lowest then
11: s = max{end′ + 1, end− L+ 1}; e = end
12: while e 6= s do
13: mid = b(s+ e)/2c
14: if PP (v(start,mid)) < τ then
15: s = mid+ 1
16: else
17: if PP (v(start,mid)) ≤ lowest then
18: start = start+ 1; end = mid+ 1
19: go to line 2
20: else
21: e = mid
22: end = e
23: else
24: start = start+ 1; end = end+ 1
25: go to line 2
26: else
27: return TopSol
28: s′ = start; e′ = end− L+ 1
29: while e′ 6= s′ do
30: mid = d(s′ + e′)/2e
31: if PP (v(mid, end)) < τ then
32: e′ = mid− 1
33: else
34: if PP (v(mid, end)) ≤ lowest then
35: start = mid+ 1; end = end+ 1
36: go to line 2
37: else
38: s′ = mid
39: if PP (v(s′, end− 1)) ≥ τ ∧ |v(s′, end− 1)| ≥ L then
40: start = s′ + 1; end = end+ 1
41: go to line 2
42: else
43: S = v(s′, end); Add S to TopSol
44: start = s′ + 1; end = end+ 1
45: return TopSol
• At every time, lowest is defined as follows:
lowest =
{
−1 if |TopSol| < k
min{PP (C) | C ∈ TopSol} if |TopSol| = k
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• “Add S to TopSol” (line 43) works as follows:
– If there exists C ∈ TopSol s.t. PP (C) = PP (S), then S is added to C;
– else if |TopSol| < k, then the class {S} is added to TopSol;
– otherwise the class C in TopSol having minimum PP (C) is replaced with
{S}.
• On line 10, PP (v(start, end)) > lowest is replaced with PP (v(start, end)) ≥
lowest;
• On line 17, PP (v(start,mid)) ≤ lowest is replaced with PP (v(start,mid)) <
lowest;
• On line 34, PP (v(mid, end)) ≤ lowest is replaced with PP (v(mid, end)) <
lowest;
The algorithm obtained by applying the modifications above is named Top-k PUC.
Theorem 8 Algorithm Top-k PUC returns the top-k partially unexplained classes of the
input instance.
Chapter 5
Experimental evaluation
We implemented Algorithms Top-k TUA, Top-k PUA, Top-k TUC and Top-k PUC, and
experimentally evaluated both running time and accuracy on real-world video and cyber
security datasets.
5.1 Video analysis
We note that identifying frame observations via the development of image processing
algorithms is an extremely challenging task—the goal of our approach is to present a
domain-independent way of identifying unexplained activities that builds upon domain-
specific ways of recognizing actions in observation sequences. Anyway, in order to
address this issue and to make a complete experimentation on real-world datasets, we
have designed and developed a specific prototype implementation for video surveillance
domain, which is able to automatically catch observation IDs with a reasonable accuracy
and to go on with the analysis until the unexplained activities are discovered. Such a
prototype is described in detail in 5.1.1 subsection.
5.1.1 The developed prototype
As we can see in figure 5.1, our prototype consists of:
• an Image Processing Library
• a Video Labeler
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Figure 5.1: The prototype architecture for video context
• an Activity Detection Engine
• the UAP Engine implementing the algorithms described in chapter 4
In particular, the Image Processing Library analyzes the video captured by sensors /
cameras and returns the low level annotations for each video frame as output; the Video
Labeler fills the semantic gap between the low level annotations captured for each frame
and high level annotations, representing the observation sequence as defined in chapter
3; then, we used an Activity Detection Engine to find activity occurrences matching the
well-known models, that can be classified into good and bad ones, as defined in section
1.2: thus, such a module takes as inputs the observation sequence previously caught
by the Video Labeler and the stochastic activity models; finally, our framework, called
UAP Engine in this overall architecture, takes as input the activity occurrences previously
found with the associated probabilities and the observation sequence and discovers the
Unexplained Video Activities.
All these components will be described into subsubsections 5.1.1.1, 5.1.1.2, 5.1.1.3,
5.1.1.4.
5.1.1.1 The Image Processing Library
With recent advances of computer technology automated visual surveillance has become
a popular area for research and development. Surveillance cameras are installed in many
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public areas to improve safety, and computer-based image processing is a promising
means to handle the vast amount of image data generated by large networks of cameras.
A number of algorithms to track people in camera images can be found in the literature,
yet so far little research has gone into building realtime visual surveillance systems that
integrate people trackers. The task of an integrated surveillance system is to warn an
operator when it detects events which may require human intervention, for example to
avoid possible accidents or vandalism. These warnings can only be reliable if the system
can detect and understand human behaviour, and for this it must locate and track people
reliably. Thus, a moltitude of Computer Vision algorithms have been developed.
Unfortunately, another issue of this kind of algorithms is due to false alarms and
lost events, which can reduce the system reliability; such a reliability is strongly related
to the environmental conditions in which the system works. Basically, the contribution
of Computer Vision on this kind of applications is based on difference analysis with a
more or less well-known model of reality. For instance, for what concerns the pixel
identification of moving objects, there is made a subtraction between the current image
and the pixels of a background model. Either, when objects are tracked, the object shapes
are compared with some reference models. A main aspect to be taken into account is how
much the environmental variations dissociate from the model. Such variations can be in
some cases due to the noise. While in indoor environments the presence of noises is
quite limited, in outdoor environments such a noise may be unrestrained and excessive
and can cause a considerable degradation of quality performances. There are numerous
applications used for these purposes. Anyway, this kind of processing can be structured
into different layers:
• pixel layer
• frame layer
• tracking layer
At the lowest layer there is located the pixel processing layer, which processes the
images captured from the source in a strictly related to pixel domain. Through the base
algorithms, a pixel identification is made in order to verify if pixels belong either to
objects or to the background of the scene. The proposed video surveillance applications
have used different kinds of pixel processing algorithms in the years. Basically, the pixel
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identification can be made either through background difference techniques or through
frame difference ones or through combinations of both of them. The knowledge at this
layer is limited at the image pixels: so, the nature and the number of the present objects
are not considered. Moreover, noise sources have to be taken into account. As a matter of
fact, a specific tuning phase is needed to restrict the presence of pixels caused by noise.
In the second processing layer (Frame Processing Layer), a first interpretation of the
image supplied by the underlying layer is executed. The relationships between pixels
detected as zone of interest are considered. The techiniques used in this context tend
to cluster the pixel found at the underlying layer, trying to erase pixels not belonging
to the interested objects and representing noise (through size filtering techniques) and
other ones which, though representing movement, belong to not-interested objects, like
shadows or areas due to lighting effects. The main aim of such a layer is to cluster the
pixels belonging to the interested objects (blobs) through different segmentation tech-
niques. Moreover, another Frame Processing task consists of the feature extraction of
the detected objects. This information will be the base for the next layer.
The Tracking layer aim consists of the pursuit and classification of the objects dis-
covered at the previous layer. It needs the knowledge of some information about the
objects previously found. For instance, this information can usually deal with size, area,
shape and all the properties that may help to identify a pixel aggregate present into dif-
ferent and often consecutive frames of the image sequence as an only object. For what
concerns video surveillance systems, there are many aspects to be taken into account for
an effective implementation. Depending on the particular application domain, there are
many constraints that may cause strong consequences on the whole process. Depending
on the application type, it is possible to identify some restricted zone of the image (Re-
gion of Interest), where the overall attention on the video surveillance process is focused.
There are some specific applications for indoor and outdoor environments and other ones
specialized in detections of particular classes of objects (as persons, cars and so on...).
The Image Processing Library used in our prototype implementation is the Reading
People Tracker (RPT) [52], [53]. This library achieved a good accuracy in object detec-
tion and tracking and is very easy to be installed and used on Unix systems. Moreover,
it returns a XML-based output format, that is very easy to understand and process.
More in details, the Reading People Tracker is a software for tracking people in cam-
era images for visual surveillance purposes. It originates from research work on people
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tracking for automatic visual surveillance systems for crime detection and prevention.
It was built within the context of two PhD theses (by AM Baumberg and NT Siebel)
and contains state-of-the art image processing algorithms. It is easily maintainable and
well documented. Therefore it can (and has already been) easily be adapted to new re-
quirements and different projects. The Reading People Tracker contains the necessary
functionality to read video sequences from hard disk or a video camera (IEEE1394/DV),
to manipulate the images with image filters and to analyse them with a number of detec-
tion and tracking modules. The Reading People Tracker as it exists today was developed
by Nils T Siebel in the European Framework V research project ADVISOR. It is based
on the Leeds People Tracker which was developed by Adam Baumberg. Starting from
there it took 3 years of work on software and algorithms to develop what is now called
the ”Reading People Tracker”. Now that the ADVISOR project has finished the Read-
ing People Tracker is still being maintained and available for download. Recent code
changes include better support for newer compilers and a number of bugfixes. There has
also been some support by the community in the form of bugfixes and a few small addi-
tions. This has increased stability and ease of use. The tracking functionality itself has
not changed significantly since release 1.25 in 2003. However, an update to the newest
version is strongly recommended for all current users.
Thus, in order for an automated visual surveillance system to operate effectively
it must locate and track people reliably and in realtime. The Reading People Tracker
achieves this by combining four detection and tracking modules, each of medium to low
complexity. As we said before, the Reading People Tracker can work either standalone
or as a subsystem of the ADVISOR system. The focus here is on tracking, specifically
on how a number of detection and tracking algorithms can be combined to achieve robust
tracking of people in an indoor environment.
Automated visual surveillance systems have to operate in realtime and with a min-
imum of hardware requirements, if the system is to be economical and scalable. This
limits the complexity of models that can be used for detection and tracking. Any attempt
at designing a People Tracker for a surveillance system like ADVISOR therefore has to
consider the realtime aspect during algorithm design.
Figure 5.2 shows the overall system layout, with individual subsystems for tracking,
detection and analysis of events, together with storage and human-computer interface
subsystems to meet the needs of the surveillance system operators. Each of these sub-
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Figure 5.2: People Tracking as one of six subsystems of ADVISOR
systems is designed to run in realtime on off-the-shelf PC hardware, with the ability to
process video input from a number of cameras simultaneously. The connections between
the subsystems are realised by Ethernet. Images are transferred across the network using
JPEG image compression. Other data, such as the output of the People Tracker and the
results of the Behaviour Analysis, are represented in XML formats defined by a number
of XML Schemas.
The Reading People Tracker has been designed to run either as a subsystem of AD-
VISOR or in standalone mode. For its design four detection and tracking modules of
medium to low complexity have been chosen, improved and combined in a single track-
ing system.
Originally based on the Leeds People Tracker, the most important one of the four
modules is a slightly modified version of Adam Baumbergs Active Shape Tracker. The
people tracker has been modified over time to increase tracking robustness, and adapted
for use in ADVISOR. The tracker was ported from a SGI platform to a PC running
GNU/Linux to facilitate economical system integration.
The People Tracking subsystem is itself comprised of four modules which cooperate
to create the overall tracking output, aiding each other to increase tracking robustness and
to overcome the limitations of individual modules. The following passages will focus on
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Figure 5.3: Overview of the four modules of the Reading People Tracker
those aspects of the tracking algorithms which are special to this system.
Figure 5.3 shows an overview of how the four modules comprise the People Tracker.
Here is a brief overview of the functionalities of the individual models.
Motion Detector: This module models the background as an image with no people in
it. The Background Image is subtracted pixelwise from the current video image and
thresholded to yield the binary Motion Image. Regions with detected moving blobs are
then extracted and written out as the output from this module.
Region Tracker: The Regions output by the Motion Detector are tracked over time by
the Region Tracker. This includes region splitting and merging using predictions from
the previous frame.
Head Detector: The Head Detector examines the areas of the binary Motion Image
which correspond to moving regions tracked by the Region Tracker. The topmost points
of the blobs in these region images that match certain criteria for size are output as
possible positions of heads in these Regions.
Active Shape Tracker: This module uses an active shape model of 2D pedestrian out-
lines in the image to detect and track people. The initialisation of contour shapes is done
from the output by the Region Tracker and the Head Detector.
The main goal of using more than one tracking module is to make up for deficiencies
in the individual modules, thus achieving a better overall tracking performance than a
single module could provide. Of course, when combining the information from different
modules, it is important to be aware of the main sources of error for those modules. If
two modules are subject to the same type of error, then there is little benefit in combining
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the outputs. The new People Tracker has been designed keeping this aspect in mind, and
using the redundancy introduced by the multiplicity of modules in an optimal manner.
These are the main features of the system:
• interaction between modules to avoid non- or mis-detection
• independent prediction in the two tracking modules, for greater robustness
• multiple hypotheses during tracking to recover from lost or mixed-up tracks
• all modules have camera calibration data available for their use
• through the use of software engineering principles for the software design, the
system is scalable and extensible (new modules...) as well as highly maintainable
and portable
Each of the modules has access to the output from the modules run previously, and to
the long-term tracking history which includes past and present tracks, together with the
full tracking status (visibility, type of object, whether it is static etc). For each tracked
object, all measurements, tracking hypotheses and predictions generated by different
modules are stored in one place.
So, for all the reasons described above, the Reading People Tracker has been chosen
as Image Processing Library of our prototype implementation. It is very easy to be used
and it takes the frame sequence of the video as inputs and returns an XML file describing
the low level annotations catched in each frame, according to a standard schema defined
in a XML Schema. We have only made some few updates to the RPT’s source code, in
order to be able to get more easily the type of each object detected in a frame (person,
package, car). For instance, figure 5.5 shows the low level annotations associated to
the frame number 18 (figure 5.4) of a video belonging to the ITEA - CANDELA dataset
(http://www.multitel.be/˜va/candela/abandon.html), which has been used to make some
prelimary experiments.
As we can see in figure 5.5, the RPT correctly identifies two objects into the frame
shown in figure 5.4: the former, identified by ID = 5, is a person, while the latter,
identified by ID = 100 is a package.
However, we have manually filtered some errors found into low level annotations, in
order to make a more reliable, correct and, first of all, unconditional experimentation of
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Figure 5.4: A video frame from ITEA-CANDELA dataset
Figure 5.5: The related low level annotations
our Unexplained Activity Detector on real-world datasets, that is the main goal of this
thesis.
5.1.1.2 The Video Labeler
As we said before, the Video Labeler fills the semantic gap between the low level an-
notations captured for each frame and the high level annotations. So, through the Video
Labeler, the observation IDs (as defined in the chapter 3) with the related action symbols
and timestamps are detected; thus, the output of the Video Labeler is the observation
sequence related to the considered video source.
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The Video Labeler has been implemented in Java programming language: it uses the
DOM libraries to parse the XML file containing the output of the Image Processing Li-
brary. The Video Library defines the rules that have to be checked to verify the presence
of each interested high level atomic event in the video. So, a Java method for each action
symbol we want to detect, containing the related rules, has been defined.
There are listed below some examples of rules defined to detect some atomic events
(action symbols) in a video belonging to the ITEA-CANDELA dataset.
Action Symbol A: A person P goes into the central zone with the package
• There are at least two objects in the current frame
• At least one of the objects is a person
• At least one of the objects is a package
• The person identified appears on the scene for the first time
• The distance between the person’s barycenter and the package one is smaller than
an apposite distance threshold
Action Symbol B: A preson P leaves the package
• There are at least two objects in the current frame
• At least one of the objects is a person
• At least one of the objects is a package
• The person was previously holding a package
• The distance between the person’s barycenter and the package one is smaller than
an apposite distance threshold
Action Symbol C: A preson P goes into the central zone
• There are at least one object in the current frame
• At least one of the objects is a person
• The person identified appears on the scene for the first time
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• If there are also some packages on the scene, their distances are greater than an
apposite distance threshold
Action Symbol D: A preson P takes the package
• There are at least two objects in the current frame
• At least one of the objects is a person
• At least one of the objects is a package
• The distance between the person’s barycenter and the package one is smaller than
an apposite distance threshold
• The person was not previously holding a package
Action Symbol E: A person P1 gives the package to another person P2
• There are at least three objects in the current frame
• At least two of the objects are persons
• At least one of the objects is a package
• P1 was previously holding a package
• In the current frame, both the distances of P1 and P2’s barycenters from the pack-
age are smaller than an apposite distance threshold
• In the next frames, P1’s distance from the package is greater than the threshold,
while P2’s one is smaller (it means that P2 has got the package and P1 is not
holding it anymore)
Action Symbol F: A person P goes out of the central zone with the package
• This symbol is detected when a person holding a package does not appear anymore
on the scene for a specified TTL
Thus, the output of the Video Labeler is the list of the action symbols detected in the
video with the related timestamps; it is encoded in comma-separated value format.
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5.1.1.3 The Activity Detection Engine
An Activity Detection Engine is able to find activity occurrences matching the well-
known models: thus, such a module takes as inputs the observation sequence previously
caught by the Video Labeler and the stochastic activity models. So, taking into account
that the activity models must follow the schema defined into chapter 3, a specific soft-
ware able to detect instances matching such models in time-stamped observation data has
been used. Such software, called tMAGIC, is the implementation of a theoretical model
presented in [54].
As a matter of fact, the [54] approach addresses the problem of efficiently detecting
occurrences of high-level activities from such interleaved data streams. In this approach,
there has been proposed a temporal probabilistic graph so that the elapsed time between
observations also plays a role in defining whether a sequence of observations constitutes
an activity. First, a data structure called temporal multiactivity graph to store multiple
activities that need to be concurrently monitored has been proposed. Then, there has
been defined an index called Temporal Multi-Activity Graph Index Creation (tMAGIC)
that, based on this data structure, examines and links observations as they occur. There
are also defined some algorithms for insertion and bulk insertion into the tMAGIC index
and show that this can be efficiently accomplished. In this approach, the algorithms
are basically defined to solve two problems: the evidence problem that tries to find all
occurrences of an activity (with probability over a threshold) within a given sequence of
observations, and the identification problem that tries to find the activity that best matches
a sequence of observations. There are introduced some complexity reducing restrictions
and pruning strategies to make the problem, which is intrinsically exponential, linear
to the number of observations. It is demonstrated that tMAGIC has time and space
complexity linear to the size of the input, and can efficiently retrieve instances of the
monitored activities.
Thus, the output of the Activity Detection Engine are the well-known activity occur-
rences matching the defined models and their probabilities: both have been efficiently
computed through the tMAGIC software.
5.1 Video analysis 61
5.1.1.4 The UAP Engine
As we have described in the previous chapters, the UAP Engine takes as input the ac-
tivity occurrences previously found by the Activity Detection Engine with the associated
probabilities and the observation sequence and finally discovers the Unexplained Video
Activities. Such a module has been developed in Java programming language and pro-
vides the implementations of algorithms Top-k TUA, Top-k PUA, Top-k TUC. As we
can also see in figure 5.1, the Java module uses some apposite APIs to interact with a
linear and a non-linear program solver. More in details, the QSopt Library has been used
for solving linear programs and the Lingo Library for non-linear ones.
Thus, the subsections 5.1.2 and 5.1.3 show the experimental evaluations we have
made in the video surveillance domain. In particular, we evaluated our framework on
two video datasets: (i) a video we shot by monitoring a university parking lot, and (ii)
a benchmark dataset about video surveillance in a train station [55]. The frame obser-
vations have been generated in a semi-automatic way using both our prototype imple-
mentation we have just described and few human interventions. We have noted that
identifying frame observations via the development of image processing algorithms is
an extremely challenging task—the goal of our work is to present a domain-independent
way of identifying unexplained activities that builds upon domain-specific ways of recog-
nizing actions in observation sequences. In contrast to the difficulty of detecting actions
in video, in cyber-security, it is easy to identify actions in an observation sequence as
they can merely be logged.
5.1.2 Parking lot surveillance video
The set A includes “known” normal activities such as parking a car, people passing, a
person getting in a car and leaving the parking lot, and abnormal activities such as a
person taking a package out of the car and leaving it in the parking lot before driving
away, or a person taking an unattended package in the parking lot. For instance, a model
of a well-known normal activity is shown in figure 5.6.
Examples of detected unexplained activities are two cars stopping next to each other
in the middle of the parking lot with the drivers exchanging something before leaving the
parking lot, or a person strolling around a car for a while before leaving the parking lot.
We compared Algorithms Top-k TUA and Top-k PUA against “naı¨ve” algorithms
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Figure 5.6: Example of a well-known activity model on the parking lot dataset
which are the same as Top-k TUA and Top-k PUA but do not exploit the optimizations
provided by the theorems in Chapter 3.2.1.
Figures 5.7 and 5.8 show that Top-k TUA and Top-k PUA significantly outperform
the naı¨ve algorithms which are not able to scale beyond videos of length 15 and 10
minutes for totally and partially unexplained activities, respectively (with longer videos,
the naı¨ve algorithms did not terminate in 3 hours). Figures 5.9(a) and 5.10(a) zoom in
on the running times for Algorithms Top-k TUA and Top-k PUA, respectively. The
runtimes in Figure 5.7 when k = 5 and k = All are almost the same (the two curves are
indistinguishable) because, up to 15 minutes, there were at most 5 totally unexplained
activities in the video. A similar argument applies to Figure 5.8.
We also evaluated how the different parameters that define a UAP instance affect the
running time by varying the values of each parameter while keeping the others fixed to a
default value.
Runtime of Top-k TUA. Table 5.1 reports the values we considered for each parameter
along with the corresponding default value.
For example, Table 5.1 says that we measured the running times to find the top-1,
top-2, top-5, and all totally unexplained activities (as the video length increases) while
Parameter Values Default value
k 1, 2, 5, All (Top-k TUA) All
1, 5, 10, All (Top-k PUA) All
τ 0.4, 0.6, 0.8 0.6
L 160, 200, 240, 280 200
# worlds 7 E+04, 4 E+05, 2 E+07 2 E+07
Table 5.1: Parameter values (parking lot dataset).
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keeping τ = 0.6, L = 200, #worlds = 2E + 07.
It is important to note that another relevant parameter has also to be considered, that
is the frame rate. It represents the frequency (rate) at which an imaging device produces
unique consecutive images called frames. We can easily deduce that, the higher is the
frame rate, the more complicated is the video, as we need a greater number of frames
per second to represent its informative content. For what concerns the parking lot video,
the frame rate has been set to 4 (4 frames per second). We want also to emphasize that
the sequence length L is measured in frames: so, it is very useful to know the used frame
rate, in order to get precise timing information.
Figure 5.7: Algorithm Top-k TUA vs. Naı¨ve.
Figure 5.8: Algorithm Top-k PUA vs. Naı¨ve.
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Varying k. Figure 5.9(a) shows that lower values of k give lower runtimes. As dis-
cussed in the preceding chapter, Algorithm Top-k TUA can infer that some sequences
are not going to be top-k TUAs and quickly prune: this is effective with lower values
of k because the probability threshold to enter the current Top-k TUAs (i.e., lowest in
Algorithm Top-k TUA) is higher, thus fewer candidates are added to the current Top-k
TUAs, making the pruning of Algorithm Top-k TUA more effective.
Varying τ . Figure 5.9(b) shows that the runtime decreases as the probability threshold
grows. Intuitively, this is because higher probability thresholds enable Algorithm Top-k
TUA to prune more.
VaryingL. Figure 5.9(c) shows that higher values ofL yield lower running times, though
there is not a big difference between L = 200 and L = 240.
Varying Number of Possible Worlds. Finally, Figure 5.9(d) shows that more possible
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Figure 5.9: Running time of Algorithm Top-k TUA on the parking lot dataset.
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worlds leads to higher running times. However, note that big differences in the number
of possible worlds yield small differences in running times, hence Algorithm Top-k TUA
is able to scale well (this is due to the application of Theorem 2 to compute PT (S)).
Runtime of Top-k PUA. The parameter values we used are reported in Table 5.1.
Varying k. The runtimes for k = 1, 5, 10 differ slightly from each other and are much
lower than when all PUAs had to be found (Figure 5.10(a)).
Varying τ . Figure 5.10(b) shows that the runtimes do not change much for different
values of τ .
Varying L. Figure 5.10(c) shows that higher values of L lead to lower runtimes.
Varying Number of Possible Worlds. Figure 5.10(d) shows that higher numbers of
possible worlds lead to higher runtimes. As with TUAs, the runtime of Top-k PUA
increases reasonably despite the steep growth of possible worlds. Runtimes of Top-k
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Figure 5.10: Running time of Algorithm Top-k PUA on the parking lot dataset.
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PUA are higher than for Top-k TUA because computing PP (S) requires solving a non-
linear program whereas PT (S) requires solving linear programs.
Precision/Recall. In order to assess accuracy, we compared the output of our algorithms
against ground truth provided by 8 human annotators who were taught the meaning of
graphical representations of activities inA (e.g., Figure 3.1). They were asked to identify
the totally and partially unexplained activities w.r.t. A. We ran Top-k TUA and Top-
k PUA with values of τ ranging from 0.4 to 0.8, looking for all totally and partially
unexplained activities (L was set to 200). We use {Sai }i∈[1,m] to denote the unexplained
sequences returned by our algorithms and {Shj }j∈[1,n] to denote the sequences flagged as
unexplained by human annotators. Precision and recall were computed as follows:
P =
|{Sai |∃Shj s.t. Sai ≈ Shj }|
m
(5.1)
and
R =
|{Shj |∃Sai s.t. Sai ≈ Shj }|
n
(5.2)
where Sai ≈p Shj means that Sai and Shj overlap by a percentage no smaller than 75%.
Precision and recall when τ = 0.4, 0.6, 0.8 are shown in Tables 5.1(a) and 5.1(b)
and Figure 5.11: we can easily notice that, the higher is the probability threshold value,
the higher is the precision, the lower is the recall and vice versa. That is exactly what
we reasonably expected. In summary, we can say that our framework achieved a good
accuracy.
((a)) Top-k TUA
τ Precision Recall
0.4 62.5 89.17
0.6 66.67 82.5
0.8 72.22 71.67
((b)) Top-k PUA
τ Precision Recall
0.4 59.65 77.38
0.6 64.91 74.6
0.8 70.18 71.83
Table 5.2: Precision and recall (parking lot dataset).
5.1.3 Train station surveillance video
We also tested our algorithms with a train station video surveillance dataset [55]. The set
A of known activities includes normal activities such as people passing, people chatting,
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Figure 5.11: Precision/Recall on the parking lot dataset
people seating, and abnormal activities like a person leaving a package unattended, or a
person taking an unattended package. For instance, a model of a well-known activity is
shown in figure 5.12.
Figure 5.12: Example of a well-known activity model on the train station dataset
68 5 Experimental evaluation
Examples of found unexplained activities are a person typing on a keypad next to
a door with the door closing afterwards, or a person leaving a suitcase on the ground,
standing next to it for a while looking at his watch different times, taking the suitcase,
and leaving the area.
Runtime of Top-k TUA. This data set is far more complex (w.r.t. number of possible
worlds) than the parking lot data set (thus, the frame rate has been set to 25). For this
reason, the “naı¨ve” algorithms did not terminate in a reasonable amount of time, even
with a video of 5 minutes. Thus, we do not show the runtimes of the naı¨ve algorithms.
As in the case of the parking lot data set, we varied the k, τ , L, # worlds parameters, as
shown in Table 5.3.
Varying k. Figure 5.13(a) shows that Top-k TUA’s runtime varies little with k when the
video is up to 15 minutes long. After that, the runtime for k = 1, 2, 5 are comparable,
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Figure 5.13: Running time of Algorithm Top-k TUA on the train station dataset.
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but the runtime for k = All starts to diverge from them.
Varying τ . Figure 5.13(b) shows that the runtime when τ = 0.4 is much higher than
when τ = 0.6 and τ = 0.8 (the latter two cases do not show substantial differences in
running time).
Varying L. Figure 5.13(c) shows that higher values of L yield lower runtimes. Though
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Figure 5.14: Running time of Algorithm Top-k PUA on the train station dataset.
Parameter Values Default value
k 1, 2, 5, All (Top-k TUA) All
1, 5, 10, All (Top-k PUA) All
τ 0.4, 0.6, 0.8 0.6
L 480, 600, 720, 840 600
# worlds 2 E+09, 6 E+20, 1 E+28 1 E+28
Table 5.3: Parameter values (train station dataset).
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the difference is small for videos under 15 minutes, it increases for 20 minute videos.
Varying Number of Possible Worlds. Figure 5.13(d) shows that runtimes for different
numbers of possible worlds are initially close (up to 15 minutes); then, the runtime for
1 E+28 possible worlds gets higher. There is only a moderate increase in runtime cor-
responding to a huge increase of the number of possible worlds—hence, Top-k TUA is
able to scale well when the video gets substantially more complex.
Runtime of Top-k PUA. We varied the k, τ , L, # worlds parameters as reported in
Table 5.3.
Varying k. Figure 5.14(a) shows that the runtime decreases as k decreases.
Varying τ . Figure 5.14(b) shows that the runtimes for τ = 0.4 and τ = 0.6 are similar
and higher than the one for τ = 0.8.
Varying L. Figure 5.14(c) shows that lower values of L give higher running times. The
runtimes are similar for L = 480 and L = 600 (the number of PUAs found in the video
are similar in both cases). Execution times are lower for L = 720 and much lower for
L = 800 (in this case, the number of PUAs found in the video is approximately half the
number of PUAs found with L = 480 and L = 600).
Varying Number of Possible Worlds. Figure 5.14(d) shows that though the runtime
grows with the number of possible worlds, Top-k PUA responds well to the steep growth
of the number of possible worlds.
Precision/Recall. We evaluated the accuracy of Top-k TUA and Top-k PUA in the same
way as for the parking lot data set. Precision and recall are reported in Tables 5.3(a),
5.3(b) and Figure 5.15. We can easily notice also in this case study that, the higher is the
probability threshold value, the higher is the precision, the lower is the recall and vice
versa. In summary, the obtained results show that we achieved high accuracy.
((a)) Top-k TUA
τ Precision Recall
0.4 56.48 80.35
0.6 78.79 76.25
0.8 81.82 73.99
((b)) Top-k PUA
τ Precision Recall
0.4 72.62 77.12
0.6 75 73.59
0.8 76.19 71.5
Table 5.4: Precision and recall (train station dataset).
5.2 Cyber security 71
Figure 5.15: Precision/Recall on the train station dataset
5.2 Cyber security
As we highlighted before, in contrast to the difficulty of detecting actions in video, in
cyber-security it is easy to identify actions in an observation sequence as they can merely
be logged.
Anyway, in order to execute an extended and complete experimentation on a real-
world dataset, we have designed and developed a specific prototype implementation for
cyber security domain. Such a prototype is described in detail in subsection 5.2.1.
5.2.1 The developed prototype
As we can see in figure 5.16, our prototype consists of:
• A network Sniffer
• A network Intrusion Detection System
• An Alert Aggregation module
• The UAP Engine
In particular, the Sniffer captures network traffic and generates the sequence of pack-
ets, the Intrusion Detection System analyzes such traffic and generates the sequence of
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Figure 5.16: The prototype architecture for cyber security context
alerts. Then, as the number of alerts returned by the IDS may be relatively high, the
Alert Aggregation module, that takes as input the identified alerts, can optionally aggre-
gate multiple alerts triggered by the same event into a macro-alert, based on a set of ad
hoc aggregation rules. For instance, we defined rules to aggregate alerts such that pro-
tocol, source address, and destination address of suspicious traffic are the same, and the
alerts are within a given temporal window. In other words, the events triggering such
alerts will be treated as a single event, thus reducing the amount of data to be processed.
Finally, our UAP Engine takes as inputs the occurrences detected during the previous step
and the whole captured traffic as well and discovers the unexplained cyber activities.
All these modules are described in the next subsections (5.2.1.1, 5.2.1.2, 5.2.1.3,
5.2.1.4).
5.2.1.1 Sniffer
The Sniffer chosen for our prototype has been Wireshark (http://www.wireshark.org/ ).
As a matter of fact, it is a free and open-source packet analyzer. It is used for network
troubleshooting, analysis, software and communications protocol development, and edu-
cation. Originally named Ethereal, in May 2006 the project was renamed Wireshark due
to trademark issues.
Wireshark is cross-platform, using the GTK+ widget toolkit to implement its user
interface, and using pcap to capture packets; it runs on various Unix-like operating sys-
tems including Linux, OS X, BSD, and Solaris, and on Microsoft Windows. There is also
a terminal-based (non-GUI) version called TShark. Wireshark, and the other programs
distributed with it such as TShark, are free software, released under the terms of the GNU
General Public License.
Wireshark is very similar to tcpdump, but has a graphical front-end, plus some inte-
grated sorting and filtering options. It allows the user to put network interface controllers
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that support promiscuous mode into that mode, in order to see all traffic visible on that
interface, not just traffic addressed to one of the interface’s configured addresses and
broadcast/multicast traffic. However, when capturing with a packet analyzer in promis-
cuous mode on a port on a network switch, not all of the traffic traveling through the
switch will necessarily be sent to the port on which the capture is being done, so cap-
turing in promiscuous mode will not necessarily be sufficient to see all traffic on the
network. Port mirroring or various network taps extend capture to any point on net;
simple passive taps are extremely resistant to malware tampering.
On Linux, BSD, and OS X, with libpcap 1.0.0 or later, Wireshark 1.4 and later can
also put wireless network interface controllers into monitor mode.
In the late 1990s, Gerald Combs, a computer science graduate of the University of
Missouri, Kansas City, was working for a small Internet service provider. The com-
mercial protocol analysis products at the time were priced around $1500 and did not
run on the company’s primary platforms (Solaris and Linux), so Gerald began writing
Ethereal and released the first version around 1998. The Ethereal trademark is owned by
Network Integration Services. In May 2006, Combs accepted a job with CACE Tech-
nologies. Combs still held copyright on most of Ethereal’s source code (and the rest
was redistributable under the GNU GPL), so he used the contents of the Ethereal Sub-
version repository as the basis for the Wireshark repository. However, he did not own
the Ethereal trademark, so he changed the name to Wireshark. In 2010 Riverbed Tech-
nology purchased CACE and took over as the primary sponsor of Wireshark. Ethereal
development has ceased, and an Ethereal security advisory recommended switching to
Wireshark. Wireshark has won several industry awards over the years, including eWeek,
InfoWorld and PC Magazine. It is also the top-rated packet sniffer in the Insecure.Org
network security tools survey and was the SourceForge Project of the Month in August
2010. Combs continues to maintain the overall code of Wireshark and issue releases of
new versions of the software. The product website lists over 600 additional contributing
authors.
Wireshark is software that ”understands” the structure of different networking proto-
cols. Thus, it is able to display the encapsulation and the fields along with their meanings
of different packets specified by different networking protocols. Wireshark uses pcap to
capture packets, so it can only capture the packets on the types of networks that pcap
supports.
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The main features of Wireshark are listed below:
• Data can be captured ”from the wire” from a live network connection or read from
a file that recorded already-captured packets.
• Live data can be read from a number of types of network, including Ethernet, IEEE
802.11, PPP, and loopback.
• Captured network data can be browsed via a GUI, or via the terminal (command
line) version of the utility, TShark.
• Captured files can be programmatically edited or converted via command-line
switches to the ”editcap” program.
• Data display can be refined using a display filter.
• Plug-ins can be created for dissecting new protocols.
• VoIP calls in the captured traffic can be detected. If encoded in a compatible
encoding, the media flow can even be played.
• Raw USB traffic can be captured.
Wireshark’s native network trace file format is the libpcap format supported by libp-
cap and WinPcap, so it can exchange files of captured network traces with other appli-
cations using the same format, including tcpdump and CA NetMaster. It can also read
captures from other network analyzers, such as snoop, Network General’s Sniffer, and
Microsoft Network Monitor.
Capturing raw network traffic from an interface requires elevated privileges on some
platforms. For this reason, older versions of Ethereal/Wireshark and tethereal/TShark
often ran with superuser privileges. Taking into account the huge number of protocol
dissectors that are called when traffic is captured, this can pose a serious security risk
given the possibility of a bug in a dissector. Due to the rather large number of vulnera-
bilities in the past (of which many have allowed remote code execution) and developers’
doubts for better future development, OpenBSD removed Ethereal from its ports tree
prior to OpenBSD 3.6.
Elevated privileges are not needed for all of the operations. For example, an alterna-
tive is to run tcpdump, or the dumpcap utility that comes with Wireshark, with superuser
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privileges to capture packets into a file, and later analyze the packets by running Wire-
shark with restricted privileges. To make near real time analysis, each captured file may
be merged by mergecap into growing file processed by Wireshark. On wireless networks,
it is possible to use the Aircrack wireless security tools to capture IEEE 802.11 frames
and read the resulting dump files with Wireshark.
As of Wireshark 0.99.7, Wireshark and TShark run dumpcap to do traffic capture.
On platforms where special privileges are needed to capture traffic, only dumpcap needs
to be set up to run with those special privileges: neither Wireshark nor TShark need to
run with special privileges, and neither of them should be run with special privileges.
5.2.1.2 Intrusion Detection System
We have chosen Snort (http://www.snort.org/ ) as Intrusion Detection System in our pro-
totype implementation.
Snort is an open source network intrusion prevention and detection system (IDS/IPS)
developed by Sourcefire. Combining the benefits of signature, protocol, and anomaly-
based inspection, Snort is the most widely deployed IDS/IPS technology worldwide. It
contains many configurable internal components that can vastly influence false positives
and negatives as well as general packet logging performance. Understanding the function
of these internal components will help customize Snort to the analyzed network and
help to avoid some of the common Snort pitfalls. Snort can be divided into five major
components that are each critical to intrusion detection. The first is the packet capturing
mechanism. Snort relies on an external packet capturing library (libpcap) to sniff packets.
After packets have been captured in a raw form, they are passed into the packet decoder.
The decoder is the first step into Snorts own architecture. The packet decoder translates
specific protocol elements into an internal data structure. After the initial preparatory
packet capture and decode is completed, traffic is handled by the preprocessors. Any
number of pluggable preprocessors either examine or manipulate packets before handing
them to the next component: the detection engine. The detection engine performs simple
tests on a single aspect of each packet to detect intrusions. The last component is the
output plugins, which generate alerts to present suspicious activity to users. A simplified
graphical representation of the dataflow is shown in Figure 5.17.
Now, let us briefly describe the five Snort components:
Packet Capturing Mechanism: to get packets into the preprocessors and then the main
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Figure 5.17: Snort component dataflow
detection engine, some prior labor must first occur. Snort has no native packet capture
facility yet; it requires an external packet sniffing library: libpcap. Libpcap was cho-
sen for packet capture for its platform independence. Using libpcap makes Snort a truly
platform-independent application. The responsibility for grabbing packets directly from
the network interface card belongs to libpcap. It makes the capture facility for raw pack-
ets provided by the underlying operating system available to other applications.
A raw packet is a packet that is left in its original, unmodified form as it had traveled
across the network from client to server. A raw packet has all its protocol header informa-
tion left intact and unaltered by the operating system. Network applications typically do
not process raw packets; they depend on the OS to read protocol information and prop-
erly forward payload data to them. Snort is unusual in this sense in that it requires the
opposite: it needs to have the packets in their raw state to function. Snort uses protocol
header information that would have been stripped off by the operating system to detect
some forms of attacks. Using libpcap is not the most efficient way to acquire raw pack-
ets. It can process only one packet at a time, making it a bottleneck for high-bandwidth
(1Gbps) monitoring situations. In the future Snort will likely implement packet capture
libraries specific to an OS, or even hardware.There are several methods other than us-
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ing libpcap for grabbing packets from a network interface card. Berkeley Packet Filter
(BPF), Data Link Provider Interface (DLPI), and the SOCK PACKET mechanism in the
Linux kernel are other tools for grabbing raw packets.
Packet Decoder: as soon as packets have been gathered, Snort must decode the specific
protocol elements for each packet. The packet decoder is actually a series of decoders
that each decode specific protocol elements. It works up the Network stack, starting with
lower level Data Link protocols, decoding each protocol as it moves up. A packet follows
this data flow as it moves through the packet decoder 5.18. As packets move through the
various protocol decoders, a data structure is filled up with decoded packet data. As soon
as packet data is stored in a data structure it is ready to be analyzed by the preprocessors
and the detection engine.
Figure 5.18: Decoder data flow
Preprocessor: Snorts preprocessors fall into two categories. They can be used to either
examine packets for suspicious activity or modify packets so that the detection engine
can properly interpret them. A number of attacks cannot be detected by signature match-
ing via the detection engine, so examine preprocessors step up to the plate and detect
suspicious activity. These types of preprocessors are indispensable in discovering non-
signature-based attacks. The other preprocessors are responsible for normalizing traffic
so that the detection engine can accurately match signatures. These preprocessors defeat
attacks that attempt to evade Snorts detection engine by manipulating traffic patterns.
Additionally, Snort cycles packets through every preprocessor to discover attacks
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that require more than one preprocessor to detect them. If Snort simply stopped check-
ing for the suspicious attributes of a packet after it had set off an alert via a preprocessor,
attackers could use this deficiency to hide traffic from Snort. Suppose a black hat inten-
tionally encoded a malicious remote exploit attack in a manner that would set off a low
priority alert from a preprocessor. If processing is assumed to be finished at this point
and the packet is no longer cycled through the preprocessors, the remote exploit attack
would register only an encoding alert. The remote exploit would go unnoticed by Snort,
obscuring the true nature of the traffic. Preprocessor parameters are configured and tuned
via the snort.conf file.
Detection Engine: is the primary Snort component. It has two major functions: rules
parsing and signature detection. The detection engine builds attack signatures by parsing
Snort rules. Snort rules are read line by line, and are loaded into an internal data structure.
The rules are loaded only when the Snort service is started, meaning that to modify, add,
or delete a rule, the user must refresh the Snort daemon. The detection engine runs traffic
through the now loaded rule set in the order that it loads them into memory. It is possible
to dictate which rules are run first by prioritizing. Rules are split into two functional
sections:
• Rule header: contains information about the conditions for applying the signature.
• Rule option: for the same exploit begins and ends with a parenthetical. The rule
option contains the actual signature, the priority level, and some documentation
about the attack.
The detection engine processes rule headers and rule options differently. The detec-
tion engine builds a linked list decision tree. The nodes of the tree test each incoming
packet for increasingly precise signature elements. A packet is tested to see whether it
is TCP; if so, it is passed to the portion of the tree that has rules for TCP. The packet
is then tested to see whether it matches a source address in a rule; if so, it passes down
the corresponding rule chains. This process happens until the packet either matches an
attack signature or tests clean and is dropped. The important thing to remember is that
Snort commences testing a packet after it has found a signature to match to the packet.
Even if the packet could possibly match another signature, the detection engine moves on
to the next packet. This is why it is valuable to organize rules so that the most malicious
signatures are loaded first.
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Output plugins: Snort’s output plugins are the means Snort has to get intrusion data to
users. The purpose of the output plugins is to dump alerting data to another resource or
file. Multiple outputting plugins can be activated to perform different functions. Loads
of external applications - some even built exclusively for Snort - are designed to read
Snorts output and manage intrusion data. Output plugins can be a major bottleneck
for Snort. Snort can read and process packets quickly, but bogs down when trying to
write to a slow database or over a network. Database output plugins are not used in
high-bandwidth environments. It is recommended to configure Snort to spool to unified
format and let Snort’s unified log application, Barnyard, take over. Snort has 12 output
plugins that push out data in different formats.
5.2.1.3 Alert Aggregation
The main purpose of using alert aggregation [41] is to reduce the redundancy of alerts by
grouping duplicate alerts and merging them into a single one. Alerts are considered to be
aggregated in terms of their attributes, such as timestamp, source IP, target IP, port(s),
user name, process name, attack class and sensor ID, as they are defined in IDMEF.
Normally, the alerts raised by different sensors with the same attributes (e.g., timestamp,
source IP, target IP, port(s), and attack class) can be merged together. Timestamps can
be slightly different but should be close enough to fall into a predefined time window. A
similar method used by Debar and Wespi in their Aggregation and Correlation Compo-
nent (ACC) is called duplicate relationship. The duplicate relationships between alerts
are defined in a duplicate definition file. Based on the definitions defined in such a file,
the attributes of the new alerts are compared with those of the previous alerts for aggre-
gation.
In addition to the aggregation, alert compression is another simple technique for
dealing with duplicate alerts. These techniques use a Run Length Encoding (RLE) to
represent a particular type of repeated alerts, that is, a recurring sequence of alerts is
simply replaced by RLE with a single alert and a run count. In most cases, identifying
redundant or duplicate alerts is not a difficult task, but for more complex cases, some
predefined criteria are required. For example, if an attacker is scanning different ranges
of the IP addresses in a network, this will trigger multiple alerts with different ranges of
target IPs, but they should still be aggregated into an only alert.
In summary, our Alert Aggregation module takes as input the previously identified
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alerts and can optionally aggregate multiple alerts triggered by the same event into a
macro-alert, based on a set of ad hoc aggregation rules. The set of the used aggregation
rules is described below.
Let us introduce the following variables:
m = number of bins
n = number of alerts
yi =
1, if the bin i is used0, otherwise for i=1,...,m
xij =
1, if alert j is assigned to bin i0, otherwise for i=1,...,m j=1,....,n
Sourcej = Source IP address of alert j
Destinationj = Destination IP address of alert j
Protocolj = Protocol of alert j
tj = Arrival time of alert j
τg = global threshold
τl = local threshold
So, we can give a formal definition of the used aggregation rules.
Rule 1: two alerts i and j are aggregated if they satisfy the following condition:
≺ Source IP,Destination IP, Protocol i=≺ Source IP,Destination IP, Protocol j
So, the following is the mathematical model of Rule 1:
z =
m∑
i=1
yi
s.t.
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
tj ∗ xij ≤ (t1 + τg) ∗ xi1 i=1,...,m j=1,....,n
tj ∗ xij ≤ (tj−1 + τl) ∗ xij−1 i=1,...,m j=1,....,n
Sourcej = Sourcej−1 j=1,....,n
Destinationj = Destinationj−1 j=1,....,n
Protocolj = Protocolj−1 j=1,....,n
yi = 0/1
xij = 0/1
Rule 2: two alerts i and j are aggregated if either:
≺ Source IP,Destination IP, Protocol i=≺ Source IP,Destination IP, Protocol j
or:
≺ Source IP,Destination IP, Protocol i=≺ Destination IP, Source IP, Protocol j
Thus, the output of the Alert Aggregation phase consists of a macro-alert list related
to the analyzed network traffic and encoded in a comma separated value format.
5.2.1.4 The UAP Engine
As we have specified before, the UAP Engine takes as inputs the macro-alert list (corre-
sponding to the occurrences of the well-known models, in the general model) detected
by the Alert Aggregation Module and the whole captured traffic as well and discovers the
unexplained cyber activities. Such a module is, of course, exactly the same as the video
surveillance context.
Next subsection (5.2.2) describes our prelimary experiments conducted on a quite-
simple University dataset.
5.2.2 The ”University of Naples” dataset
We ran some preliminary evaluations with a cyber security dataset consisting of network
traffic from University of Naples network.
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We used the prototype implementation described before to get first packet sequences,
then the alert sequences and finally the aggregated alerts. So, we ran our UAP Engine.
The list of the executed experiments is shown below.
Runtime. We varied the k, τ , L, #worlds parameters as shown in Table 5.5 and used all
Snort rules as the set of activity models. As we can notice through the number of worlds
listed in table 5.5, this dataset is definitely easier than the video surveillance ones, also
because the Alert Aggregation Module significantly prunes the number of alerts which
was at the beginning enormous. Moreover, it is clear that the frame rate parameter does
not make sense in a cyber security context, so L is measured in milliseconds.
Parameter Values Default value
k 1, 2, 5, All (Top-k TUA) All
1, 3, 6, All (Top-k PUA) All
τ 0.4, 0.6, 0.8 0.6
L 180000, 300000, 420000, 480000 300000
# worlds 2341, 65457, 897653 897653
Table 5.5: Parameter values (cyber security dataset).
Running times for Algorithm Top-k TUA and Algorithm Top-k PUA are shown in
Figures 5.19 and 5.20, respectively. They confirm the trend already seen with video data:
runtime decreases as L and τ (resp. k and the number of possible worlds) increase (resp.
decrease).
Accuracy. We measured accuracy as follows. Let A be the set of all Snort rules. First,
we detected all occurrences of A in the data stream. We then ignored a certain subset
A′ of A and identified the unexplained sequences. Clearly, ignoring models in A′ is
equivalent to not having those models available. Thus, occurrences of ignored activties
are expected to have a relatively high probability of being unexplained as there is no
model for them. We measured the fraction of such occurrences that have been flagged as
unexplained for different values of τ .
Specifically, we considered two settings: one where only ICMP rules in A were
ignored, and another one where only preprocessor rules in A were ignored. ICMP rules
are Snort rules designed to analyze ICMP packets (e.g., echo request a.k.a. ping) and
alert on suspicious or malformed ICMP packets. For instance, a ping sweep is a passive
reconnaissance attack that uses multiple echo requests to establish which IP addresses
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Figure 5.19: Running time of Algorithm Top-k TUA on the cyber security dataset.
map to live hosts. Some packets and applications have to be decoded into plain text
for Snort rules to trigger. Prepocessor rules are designed to handle such situations. For
instance, the arpspoof preprocessor is fed a list of IP:MAC addresses. When it detects a
layer-2 attack, it triggers an alarm for a layer-2 event, such as multiple MAC addresses
from a single IP. The results are reported in Tables 5.6 and 5.7 for Top-k TUA and Top-k
PUA, respectively, and show that our framework achieved good accuracy. When ICMP
rules were ignored, unexplained sequences were sequences where ICMP activities were
occurring, and likewise when preprocessor rules were ignored.
5.3 Experimental Conclusions
Our experiments show that:
(i) Runtime increases with observation sequence length (because there are more possible
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Figure 5.20: Running time of Algorithm Top-k PUA on the cyber security dataset.
((a)) Ignoring ICMP rules
τ Accuracy
0.4 85.71
0.6 71.42
0.8 68.17
((b)) Ignoring Preprocessor rules
τ Accuracy
0.4 75.12
0.6 63.84
0.8 59.29
Table 5.6: Accuracy of Top-k TUA (cyber security dataset).
worlds, causing LC(v) and NLC(v) to have more variables and constraints). Despite
the enormous blow-up in the number of possible worlds, our algorithms perform very
well showing quadratic performance in all three datasets.
(ii) Runtime increases with the number of totally or partially unexplained activities present
in the video. This is because determining the exact endpoints of each TUA (resp. PUA)
is costly. Specifically, determining the exact end frame of a TUA requires computing
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((a)) Ignoring ICMP rules
τ Accuracy
0.4 91.24
0.6 83.39
0.8 72.84
((b)) Ignoring Preprocessor rules
τ Accuracy
0.4 88.76
0.6 76.24
0.8 74.85
Table 5.7: Accuracy of Top-k PUA (cyber security dataset).
PT many times: when a TUA is found, Top-k TUA (and also Top-k TUC) need to go
through the while loop of lines 7–14, the binary search in the while loop of lines 16–25,
and the if block of lines 26–31. All these code blocks require PT to be computed. Like-
wise, determining the exact start and end frames of a PUA requires PP to be computed
many times as Algorithm Top-k PUA (as well as Algorithm Top-k PUC) goes through
different loops and binary searches (one to determine the start frame, another to deter-
mine the end frame) requiring multiple computations of PP .
(iii) In general, the number of TUAs and PUAs in the observation sequence decreases as
τ and L increase, because higher values of τ and L are stricter conditions for a sequence
to be totally or partially unexplained.
(iv) Runtime decreases as k decreases because our algorithms use k intelligently to infer
that certain sequences are not going to be in the result (aborting the loops and binary
searches mentioned above).
(v) Precision increases whereas recall decreases as τ increases. The experimental re-
sults have shown that a good compromise can be achieved by setting τ at least 0.6 and
that our framework had a good accuracy with all the datasets we considered.

Chapter 6
Conclusions
Suppose we have a sequence v of time-stamped observation data and a setA of “known”
activities (normal or suspicious). This thesis addresses the problem of finding subse-
quences of v that are not “sufficiently” explained by the activities in A. We formally
define what it means for a sequence to be unexplained by defining totally and partially
unexplained sequences. We propose a possible worlds framework and identify interest-
ing properties that can be leveraged to make the search for unexplained activities highly
efficient via intelligent pruning. We leverage these properties to develop the Top-k TUA,
Top-k PUA, Top-k TUC, Top-k PUC algorithms to find totally and partially unexplained
activities with highest probabilities. We conducted experimentals over three datasets in
the video and cyber security domains showing that our approach has good running time
and high accuracy.
This thesis represents a start towards detecting unexplained activities in a domain
independent way. Much future work is possible. For instance, we may wish to allow
activity occurrences to violate the temporal constraints in the stochastic automata based
activity model by penalizing such activity occurrences via diminished probabilities. This
can be done in many ways.
Second, we would like to increase scalability of our algorithms, possibly through the
development of specialized data structures to support identification of the Top-k TUA,
Top-k PUA, Top-k TUC, Top-k PUC algorithms.
Third, the assumption of independence after conflict-based partitioning is convenient
and follows upon much work in computer science that makes such assumptions—but it
88 6 Conclusions
may not be appropriate for all applications. Relaxing this assumption is also an important
direction for future work.
Bibliography
[1] M. Albanese, V. Moscato, A. Picariello, V. S. Subrahmanian, and O. Udrea, “De-
tecting stochastically scheduled activities in video,” in IJCAI, pp. 1802–1807, 2007.
[2] S. Hongeng and R. Nevatia, “Multi-agent event recognition,” in ICCV, pp. 84–93,
2001.
[3] H. Buxton and S. Gong, “Visual surveillance in a dynamic and uncertain world,”
Artif. Intell., vol. 78, no. 1-2, pp. 431–459, 1995.
[4] T. Huang, D. Koller, J. Malik, G. Ogasawara, B. Rao, S. Russell, and J. Weber, “Au-
tomatic symbolic traffic scene analysis using belief networks,” in PROCEEDINGS
12TH NATIONAL CONFERENCE IN AI, pp. 966–972, AAAI Press, 1994.
[5] S. Hongeng and R. Nevatia, “Multi-agent event recognition,” in Computer Vision,
2001. ICCV 2001. Proceedings. Eighth IEEE International Conference on, vol. 2,
pp. 84–91 vol.2, 2001.
[6] S. S. Intille and A. F. Bobick, “A framework for recognizing multi-agent action
from visual evidence,” in Proceedings of the sixteenth national conference on Arti-
ficial intelligence and the eleventh Innovative applications of artificial intelligence
conference innovative applications of artificial intelligence, AAAI ’99/IAAI ’99,
(Menlo Park, CA, USA), pp. 518–525, American Association for Artificial Intelli-
gence, 1999.
[7] T. Starner, J. Weaver, and A. Pentland, “Real-time american sign language recogni-
tion using desk and wearable computer based video,” Pattern Analysis and Machine
Intelligence, IEEE Transactions on, vol. 20, no. 12, p. 1371–1375, 1998.
90 Bibliography
[8] B. H. Juang and L. R. Rabiner, “Hidden Markov Models for Speech Recognition,”
Technometrics, vol. 33, no. 3, 1991.
[9] A. Kaltenmeier, T. Caesar, J. M. Gloger, and E. Mandler, “Sophisticated topology
of hidden Markov models for cursive script recognition,” pp. 139–142, 1993.
[10] S. Hongeng, R. Nevatia, and F. Bremond, “Video-based event recognition: activ-
ity representation and probabilistic recognition methods,” Comput. Vis. Image Un-
derst., vol. 96, pp. 129–162, Nov. 2004.
[11] D. Zhang, D. Gatica-Perez, S. Bengio, and I. McCowan, “Semi-supervised adapted
hmms for unusual event detection,” in Proceedings of the 2005 IEEE Computer So-
ciety Conference on Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition (CVPR’05) - Volume
1 - Volume 01, CVPR ’05, (Washington, DC, USA), pp. 611–618, IEEE Computer
Society, 2005.
[12] M. Brand, N. Oliver, and A. Pentland, “Coupled hidden markov models for com-
plex action recognition,” in Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition, 1997. Pro-
ceedings., 1997 IEEE Computer Society Conference on, pp. 994–999, 1997.
[13] N. Vaswani, A. K. R. Chowdhury, and R. Chellappa, “”shape activity”: A
continuous-state hmm for moving/deforming shapes with application to abnor-
mal activity detection,” IEEE Transactions on Image Processing, vol. 14, no. 10,
pp. 1603–1616, 2005.
[14] M. Brand, N. Oliver, and A. Pentland, “Coupled hidden markov models for com-
plex action recognition,” in CVPR, pp. 994–999, 1997.
[15] N. Oliver, E. Horvitz, and A. Garg, “Layered representations for human activity
recognition,” in ICMI, pp. 3–8, 2002.
[16] R. Hamid, Y. Huang, and I. Essa, “Argmode - activity recognition using graphical
models,” in CVPRW, pp. 38–43, 2003.
[17] N. P. Cuntoor, B. Yegnanarayana, and R. Chellappa, “Activity modeling using event
probability sequences,” IEEE Transactions on Image Processing, vol. 17, no. 4,
pp. 594–607, 2008.
Bibliography 91
[18] D. Zhang, D. Gatica-Perez, S. Bengio, and I. McCowan, “Semi-supervised adapted
hmms for unusual event detection,” in CVPR, pp. 611–618, 2005.
[19] M. T. Chan, A. Hoogs, J. Schmiederer, and M. Petersen, “Detecting rare events in
video using semantic primitives with hmm,” in ICPR, pp. 150–154, 2004.
[20] T. Xiang and S. Gong, “Video behavior profiling for anomaly detection,” IEEE
Trans. Pattern Anal. Mach. Intell., vol. 30, no. 5, pp. 893–908, 2008.
[21] J. Kim and K. Grauman, “Observe locally, infer globally: A space-time mrf for
detecting abnormal activities with incremental updates,” in CVPR, 2009.
[22] J. Yin, Q. Yang, and J. J. Pan, “Sensor-based abnormal human-activity detection,”
IEEE Trans. Knowl. Data Eng., vol. 20, no. 8, pp. 1082–1090, 2008.
[23] D. H. Hu, X.-X. Zhang, J. Yin, V. W. Zheng, and Q. Yang, “Abnormal activity
recognition based on hdp-hmm models,” in IJCAI, pp. 1715–1720, 2009.
[24] X.-X. Zhang, H. Liu, Y. Gao, and D. H. Hu, “Detecting abnormal events via hier-
archical dirichlet processes,” in PAKDD, pp. 278–289, 2009.
[25] D. Mahajan, N. Kwatra, S. Jain, P. Kalra, and S. Banerjee, “A framework for activ-
ity recognition and detection of unusual activities,” in ICVGIP, 2004.
[26] F. Jiang, Y. Wu, and A. K. Katsaggelos, “Detecting contextual anomalies of crowd
motion in surveillance video,” in ICIP, pp. 1117–1120, 2009.
[27] M. Breunig, H. Kriegel, R. Ng, and J. Sander, “Identifying density-based local
outliers,” in Proc. ACM SIGMOD Intl Conf. Management of Data (SIGMOD 00),
pp. 93–104, 2000.
[28] H. Zhong, J. Shi, and M. Visontai, “Detecting unusual activity in video,” in CVPR,
pp. 819–826, 2004.
[29] C. E. Au, S. Skaff, and J. J. Clark, “Anomaly detection for video surveillance ap-
plications,” in ICPR, pp. 888–891, 2006.
[30] Y. Zhou, S. Yan, and T. S. Huang, “Detecting anomaly in videos from trajectory
similarity analysis,” in ICME, pp. 1087–1090, 2007.
92 Bibliography
[31] A. Mecocci and M. Pannozzo, “A completely autonomous system that learns
anomalous movements in advanced videosurveillance applications,” in ICIP,
pp. 586–589, 2005.
[32] L. Brun, A. Saggese, and M. Vento, “A clustering algorithm of trajectories for
behaviour understanding based on string kernels,” in SITIS’12, pp. 267–274, 2012.
[33] J. Wang, Z. Cheng, M. Zhang, Y. Zhou, and L. Jing, “Design of a situation-aware
system for abnormal activity detection of elderly people,” in Active Media Tech-
nology (R. Huang, A. Ghorbani, G. Pasi, T. Yamaguchi, N. Yen, and B. Jin, eds.),
vol. 7669 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science, pp. 561–571, Springer Berlin Hei-
delberg, 2012.
[34] B. T. Morris and M. M. Trivedi, “Trajectory learning for activity understanding:
Unsupervised, multilevel, and long-term adaptive approach,” IEEE Trans. Pattern
Anal. Mach. Intell., vol. 33, no. 11, pp. 2287–2301, 2011.
[35] A. Adam, E. Rivlin, I. Shimshoni, and D. Reinitz, “Robust real-time unusual event
detection using multiple fixed-location monitors,” IEEE Trans. Pattern Anal. Mach.
Intell., vol. 30, no. 3, pp. 555–560, 2008.
[36] F. Jiang, J. Yuan, S. A. Tsaftaris, and A. K. Katsaggelos, “Video anomaly detection
in spatiotemporal context,” in ICIP, pp. 705–708, 2010.
[37] A. Gupta, P. Srinivasan, J. Shi, and L. S. Davis, “Understanding videos, construct-
ing plots learning a visually grounded storyline model from annotated videos,” in
CVPR, pp. 2012–2019, 2009.
[38] M. Albanese, C. Molinaro, F. Persia, A. Picariello, and V. S. Subrahmanian, “Find-
ing unexplained activities in video,” in IJCAI, pp. 1628–1634, 2011.
[39] P. Ning, Y. Cui, and D. S. Reeves, “Constructing attack scenarios through corre-
lation of intrusion alerts,” in CCS 2002, (Washington, DC, USA), pp. 245–254,
ACM, November 2002.
[40] P. Garcı´a-Teodoro, J. Dı´az-Verdejo, G. Macia´-Ferna´ndez, and E. Va´zquez,
“Anomaly-based network intrusion detection: Techniques, systems and chal-
lenges,” Computers & Security, vol. 28, pp. 18–28, February-March 2009.
Bibliography 93
[41] A. Jones and S. Li, “Temporal signatures for intrusion detection,” in ACSAC, (New
Orleans, LA, USA), pp. 252–261, IEEE Computer Society, December 2001.
[42] L. Wang, A. Liu, and S. Jajodia, “Using attack graphs for correlating, hypothesiz-
ing, and predicting intrusion alerts,” Computer Communications, vol. 29, pp. 2917–
2933, September 2006.
[43] S. Noel, E. Robertson, and S. Jajodia, “Correlating intrusion events and building
attack scenarios through attack graph distances,” in ACSAC, (Tucson, AZ, USA),
pp. 350–359, December 2004.
[44] H. Debar and A. Wespi, “Aggregation and correlation of intrusion-detection alerts,”
in RAID (W. Lee, L. Me´, and A. Wespi, eds.), vol. 2212 of Lecture Notes in Com-
puter Science, (Davis, CA, USA), pp. 85–103, Springer, October 2001.
[45] S. O. Al-Mamory and H. Zhang, “Ids alerts correlation using grammar-based ap-
proach,” Journal of Computer Virology, vol. 5, pp. 271–282, November 2009.
[46] J. P. Anderson, “Computer security threat monitoring and surveillance,” tech. rep.,
James P. Anderson Co., Fort Washington, PA, USA, April 1980.
[47] B. Mukherjee, L. T. Heberlein, and K. N. Levitt, “Network intrusion detection,”
IEEE Network, vol. 8, pp. 26–41, May 1994.
[48] X. Qin and W. Lee, “Statistical causality analysis of INFOSEC alert data,” in RAID
(G. Vigna, C. Kruegel, and E. Jonsson, eds.), vol. 2820 of Lecture Notes in Com-
puter Science, (Pittsburgh, PA, USA), pp. 73–93, Springer, September 2003.
[49] X. Qin, A Probabilistic-Based Framework for INFOSEC Alert Correlation. Phd
thesis, Georgia Institute of Technology, August 2005.
[50] A. J. Oliner, A. V. Kulkarni, and A. Aiken, “Community epidemic detection using
time-correlated anomalies,” in RAID (S. Jha, R. Sommer, and C. Kreibich, eds.),
vol. 6307 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science, (Ottawa, Canada), pp. 360–381,
Springer, September 2010.
[51] S. Tsukiyama, M. Ide, H. Ariyoshi, and I. Shirakawa, “A new algorithm for generat-
ing all the maximal independent sets,” SIAM J. Comput., vol. 6, no. 3, pp. 505–517,
1977.
94 Bibliography
[52] N. T. Siebel and S. Maybank, “Fusion of multiple tracking algorithms for robust
people tracking,” in In Proc. of ECCV02, pp. 373–387, 2002.
[53] N. T. Siebel and S. J. Maybank, “The advisor visual surveillance system,” in in
ECCV 2004 workshop Applications of Computer Vision (ACV, 2004.
[54] M. Albanese, A. Pugliese, and V. Subrahmanian, “Fast activity detection: Indexing
for temporal stochastic automaton-based activity models,” IEEE Transactions on
Knowledge and Data Engineering, vol. 25, no. 2, pp. 360–373, 2013.
[55] “Ninth IEEE international workshop on performance evaluation of tracking and
surveillance (PETS 2006) benchmark data.” http://www.cvg.rdg.ac.uk/
PETS2006/data.html, 2006.
